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Introduction
The role of language in our lives, our perceptions, and our knowledge has long been
the subject of philosophical inquiry. A still-pervasive theme in the discourse on language
revolves around the idea that meaning, that the content of our words and expressions, is
grounded in that which they reference in the world. The word “rock” means what it does
because there is a thing in the world, namely a rock, that the word ‘points to’ and
consequently means. Contrastingly, in his 
Philosophical Investigations,
Ludwig
Wittgenstein argues that this reduction of language to representation cannot possibly
encompass the whole of what we do with language. Wittgenstein emphasizes the point
that there is no one thing that language simply 
is1
, no generalizable, “ultimate,” meaning
to our words, and that the human activity of language (the “form of life”2) is situated
within, is a part of, the regular activity of human life and, as such, a very large portion “
of
cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for all—this word can be
explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”3
By elaborating the notion of meaning beyond the confines of mere representation,
Wittgenstein opens the door for an understanding of the ‘mind-independent world’ that
need not, at base, rely on the traditional picture of an ultimate reality composed of

In section §23 of the 
Investigations
, Wittgenstein remarks that these, which are by no means
encompassing (or even fractionally representative) of the diversity of our language, are the sort of thing we do
with language: giving orders and acting on them, describing an object, speculating about an event, forming a
hypothesis, making up a story, reading a story, acting, singing, guessing riddles, telling a joke, solving a
problem, translating, requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying, &c.
2
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, §23. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print.
3
Investigations, §43
1
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ultimate-things (of ‘things-in-themselves’).4 By deposing the referential (denotative,
definitional, representational, &c.) picture of language and meaning, Wittgenstein
prefigures a kind of anti-realist sentiment that allows for a discussion of things, meaning,
knowledge, and emotion that will become the focus of this project.
In the coming chapter I will review a line of skeptical argument that, as I intend to
demonstrate, is manifest from an understanding of the objective world as stratified — as
composed of individual pieces which I will typically refer to as “objects-in-themselves” for
the idea of an entity that exists a
s
an entity (as a bounded, discrete ‘thing’) fully
independent of human cognition, can be restated as the idea of an object-in-and-of-itself,
as an object that is so not through its conception within the human mind or the activity of
language, but rather by virtue of itself alone. It is important to note that the skeptical
argument I will present in the coming pages is neither meant to be indicative or
representative of the diverse field of skeptical thought, but rather is intended to serve as a
microcosm for a line of philosophical reasoning that remains pervasive, both implicitly and
explicitly, within a great deal of philosophical discourse past and present. By evaluating
what kind of idea ‘objects-in-themselves’ is, and what kind of picture of language it
fosters, I will present an alternative understanding of objective reality (or rather, an
alternative understanding of language through which the notion of objective reality can be
seen to have no sensible place in ordinary discourse) that, with the help of Wittgenstein,

4

Note here that the use of “mind-independent world,” “ultimate reality,” “objective reality,” &c. are
all used interchangeably to indicate the idea of a fundamentally existent world — of what exists, not within the
confines of human experience, but as the underlying (or, as I will sometimes say, “transcendent”) reality. This
idea will be most often utilized in the context of my investigation into the notion of ‘things-in-themselves,’
which I will also refer to synonymously as “objects-in-themselves,” “objects-in-and-of-themselves,” “objects
independent of human cognition,” and so on.
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J.L. Austin, and Stanley Cavell, may rid us of the need to seek generality5 and objectivity.
As with the cessation of any foundational belief, it will be important that we attend
not only to the untenability of a referential mode but also to the gaps that are left when
such thinking is abandoned. For example, it is vital that we establish an alternative
understanding of the role of grammar, convention, and community such that we might
make sense of the success, efficacy, &c. of language — and, importantly, how such
concepts as ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘correctness’ remain sensible without the crutch of
reference to anchor them. To this end Austin’s essay, in tandem with Wittgenstein’s
notion of criteria (and Cavell’s invaluable examination of that notion), will let us discern
something important about the role language plays in our ascriptions and expressions of
experiential states.
In the second chapter of this project I will reconcile the purported non-existence of
ultimate constituent pieces of reality with the intuitive and seemingly self-evident
existence of objects, of things, in our own lives. In an attempt to dissuade us from taking
our own diversely populated perceptions to be indicative of a parallel, external reality
likewise composed, I will examine how precisely we are trained in language and into a
language-speaking community and then elaborate on this training with a discussion of the
way language inflects the many ways we see and understand the world around us. This
discussion is intended to provide a preliminary intuition for the way that our language
training, and, as we will see, no less than our entire natural history as full-blooded human
beings, consolidates a lens through which we perceive the world, perceive objects,

5

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. T
he Blue and Brown Books (BB)
, 1. 1958, Oxford: Blackwell.
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perceive emotion.
This last brings us to the final chapter: an analysis of other minds, our ability to
know them, and our capacity to see (recognize, call out, act on, &c.) the emotions of
others. In order to explain such a contentious and superficially unintuitive idea as ‘the
visibility of emotion’ I will begin by paraphrasing the thoughts of J.L. Austin from his
essay 
Other Minds
. Having proceeded through the first two chapters, I hope by this point
to have cultivated a budding understanding of the way that our training with language
shapes our perceptions.
In contrast to 
Other Minds
though, I will attempt to undermine the “something
special” that Austin ultimately sustains as a characteristic and troubling facet of our
attempts to ‘know’ the emotion of others. This argument will take form in the thesis that
behavior is honest 
and, however inadequate our perceptions and judgments of emotion in
others may be — undoubtedly we are often wrong or, at least, reductive in our attempts to
recognize the emotions of those around us — such errors (if we could call them that) are a
reflection of 1). The nuance and complexity of felt-experience (relative to the blunt and
often reductive character of linguistic expressions) and 2). The informationally rich
contextual details, personal relationships, and natural histories that are sometimes more
and sometimes less integral to our perceptions, assessments, judgments, ascriptions, &c.
of the emotion of others.
An aside: 
I expect that at this moment it will seem a far leap to equate our
“assessment” of someone’s emotion with our “perception” of it, however, this language is
vitally important to the views I will be presenting — As I mentioned before, the second

Segal
7

chapter will be devoted to the idea that perception is not the passive reception of sense
data and rather that language (and, for that matter, our entire natural history) inflects
(constitutes?) the way we see and interact with the world: The talented musician may
hear the individual notes, chords; the learned painter may see the world in its composite
colors; the language-proficient reader can see the words on the page, the sentences, the
meaning (and not, say, squiggles of ink on a page or, even more primitively, a splotched
mess of black and white).
As such, I will be arguing for the notion that our training with language and other
relevant cultural and social practices facilitates, literally, the perception of emotion in
others. The tiredness of the student with the slowly shutting eyes, the nodding head, and
slumped posture, can be seen as much as the chair he sits in. 
Thus it is no accident that
our discussion will focus on Wittgenstein’s ideas about symptoms and criteria as well as
those on ascriptions of emotion. that locutions about emotion (“I’m happy” or “I think he’s
in pain”) are 
expressions 
of that emotion, as much as any behavior (scratching at an area
as an expression of feeling itchy, for example) is.
This will likely come up again but, to clarify, I am not asserting that we are
somehow capable of 
introspecting
the emotion of another person — obviously, except in
highly special empathetic circumstances, we do not share the quality of their experience.
Rather, the decisive point is that the quality of the experience of anger simply fails to
encompass all of what we mean by “anger,” all of what ‘anger’ is. Anger has rich and
varied cultural connotations, it is deeply seated within the context of an individual’s life
(they have their own connotations, associations, &c. for anger), it is a piece of language
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with a particular pronunciation, it is a part of numerous idiomatic expressions, it is used
for blackmail and persuasion (“You wouldn’t like me when I’m angry”) — Anger is a
radically more detailed and rich concept than its phenomenology can hope to account for.
When I say that we see the bored student, it is not because I am somehow literally feeling
bored by looking at him, but simply this: He is bored! The wandering eyes, the vacant
dissociated expression; these things are all part of what boredom is (as much as the feeling
of boredom), and by virtue of my training with language ‘boredom’ and the presentation of
these criteria facilitate my perception of ‘bored’ — and no less the fact that I am in a
classroom, that there is a teacher, that this person has a backpack, &c. all inform me that
this is a student!
Given the general layout of each chapter to come I hope it is clear that the topics to
be covered, while distinct, are interwoven and depend upon one another in important
ways. The skeptical argument serves to highlight a particular kind of presupposition
common to certain strains of analytic argument such that we might inspect our
assumptions about reference and reality. This is exemplified in the notion of
objects-in-themselves which, once sufficiently disassembled, provides us a kind of
ontological ‘blank slate’ whereupon we can begin to piece together a view of language and
the world that needn’t be tethered to any notion of essence, objective reality, referent, &c.
As we establish this, at least in a preliminary way, we will then move into an examination
of perception — through what some would call an ‘embodied cognition framework6 — as

6

While I will not spend much time contextualizing the picture of language and perception that I put
forward, it is worth briefly noting that there is much in common with and inspired by the scientific and
philosophical notion of embodied cognition. Specifically, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s P
hilosophy in the
Flesh
has remained a touchstone for my thinking over the years despite the relative independence of their work
from that of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell.
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constructive: powerfully manifest from physical context of our bodies and deeply inflected
by our history in the world (notable in that history is, of course, language). By discussing
our language training we might also elaborate a notion of convention, regulation, and
grammar, that can account for many of the concepts (truth, accuracy, success, to name a
few) commonly taken to be indicative of ‘things-in-themselves,’ ‘objective reality,’
‘meaning as reference,’ &c. It is only then, after arriving at the two primary viewpoints of
the previous chapters and, more importantly, that our discussion of emotion will be
properly contextualized.
Finally, there are many ways in which the resources of language, in Wittgenstein’s
words, “bewitch us.” My own writing is of course no exception and there are a great deal
of instances where the language I must rely upon to convey some idea or intuition belies
(and in some cases even contradicts) my overall aims. I will make an effort going forward
to preface such instances as they appear, however, there are cases in which the denial of
contradictory or hypocritical rhetoric seems to inescapably result in such opaque linguistic
contortions as the previously mentioned, “objects-in-and-of-themselves,” and thus some
combination of the two must be made use of in order to adequately and least bemusingly
convey these ideas.
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I.

Objects and Skepticism

1 Organic Doubt on Uncertain Ground
Years ago I was wandering the premises of the nature reserve, aptly called “the
sanctuary,” at the boarding school I attended. At my side was a close friend with whom I
had often discussed the many perplexities of my youth. One day in particular I had been
considering a previous conversation we had and was suddenly struck by an odd thing. In
this earlier conversation we were discussing the ever-contentious death penalty, the
ethical ramifications of taking someone’s life, the seeming hypocrisy of violent punishment
for violent crime, the possibility that the mere existence of the penalty, the threat of death,
serves as a valuable disincentive for would-be criminals, and so on. Whatever the
conclusion of the discussion was, what I recall most distinctly was the simple fact that my
position, following our conversation, had changed. Certainly this should not seem so odd,
but, somehow in the particular context of my life at that moment, during that walk, I was
devastated by that reality. My views on this topic had fundamentally shifted. What I
found so startling, so unsettling, was the sudden realization that — if my beliefs change,
have changed, and will in all likelihood, given all available evidence, continue to change —
how, in light of the suddenly apparent ephemerality of my beliefs, could I claim certainty,
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in the views that I held now? Perhaps this cursory, adolescent formulation of an age old
philosophical theme is not ultimately tenable, but the lived experience itself indicates to us
something of the nature of the skeptical problem, of the felt urgency that skeptical thought
demands. We can see here that philosophical skepticism is not merely the product of
esoteric philosophizing, alien to real human experience, and ought not be dismissed as
such. However, if we are to understand what the skeptic puts forward and why it falls on
deaf ears, we should first more clearly dissemble the scaffolding of her argument.
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that philosophical skepticism takes
many and variegated forms. The example that we will be examining is only one of many
brands of skepticism and I have no intention of claiming that our breed of skepticism can
stand for all arguments in the rich skeptical tradition. That being said, in our evaluation
we will uncover an ultimately fatal assumption present in the skeptic’s argument that I
believe endemic to much of skeptical thought and beyond. That is, our investigation into a
particular characterization of skepticism stands to highlight a way of thinking about
language that, as will be argued further on, is both philosophically misbegotten and yet
pervasive among both old and contemporary discourse.
In the traditional skeptic’s argument the claim “that is an apple” is met with the
request for a basis, such as “I can see it in plain view in front of me.” This basis is then
confronted with a grounds for doubt, such as “your experience with what you are
perceiving to be an apple could in actuality just be taking place within a dream, in which
case really there would be no apple,” or “your basis for knowing there is an apple in front
of you is that you see it, but you do not see all of it, you do not see the back or inside, so

Segal
12

how can you 
know
it is an apple?,” or “the perception of a curved stick in water does not
warrant ‘knowledge’ that the stick is curved, so how could the sight of the apple constitute
knowledge that it is indeed an apple?” While ‘on the inside’ of a dream there are no
discernible qualities distinguishing the dream from real life — having had experiences
where, upon awakening, I mused “That dream was so realistic that I had no idea I was in
a dream,” it is the kind of naturally occurring doubt which in the Cartesian sense stands
as sensible. The force of this is something like: I am unjustified in making the claim “that
is an apple in front of me,” or “I know that is an apple,” because, in reality, I am (could
be) dreaming; I am (could be) seeing only a cardboard facsimile of an apple, a projection of
an apple, and so on. That is to say, the possibility of dreaming means I do not actually
know and so am not justified in my knowledge claim. And, with the ultimate qualification
that we take a ‘best possible case’ of knowledge (the apple is in plain view, in broad
daylight, I am unimpaired, &c.) entails that, if we can not know here, then we can not
know 
anywhere
. Surely if, in the most clear case of our knowing something, it is proven
that we merely ‘believe,’ then in all descending cases of more ambiguous, less clearly-cut
knowledge, we must also be laboring under a delusion.
The skeptic wants to say that if there exists the slightest ground for doubt, then
there cannot be certainty, only belief — that, if doubt is still present in an ideal case, then
we cannot have certainty 
generally
. Undoubtedly the argument for the inadequacy of
sensation is a convincing one, we have all experienced from time to time the fallibility of
our senses, our memories; more than once I have been out for a walk at night only to work
myself up by misjudging a tree to be a person (did I judge the tree to be a person or did I
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see the tree as a person?). The skeptic uses the occasional failure of our sensory
judgments as a demonstration of the principled barrier between the observer and the
observed, the perception and the thing-perceived. In doing so the skeptic thus draws on a
familiar intuition, one that has been held by philosophers since antiquity: From Plato’s
distinction between form and essence and Aristotle’s “object itself” versus its
“hylomorphic form” to Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities and,
popularizer of philosophical skepticism himself, Descartes’ epistemological dualism. So
what does this distinction hold? What is it that we lack when it is said that we merely
perceive the form and not the ‘object itself’? If, as the skeptic portends, this lack entails a
lack of entitlement to knowledge, to certainty, then what is the certainty that the skeptic
seeks?
When looking at an apple on a table, in clear view, I cannot, the skeptic says,
justifiably claim “I know that’s an apple” because, surely, it could be a cardboard
representation, a mere facsimile of an apple. What, then, if I walk the perimeter of the
table, viewing the apple from many different directions? Not so, the skeptic replies, that
could simply be a convincing plastic apple. As long as there is the possibility, however
remote, of being wrong (“It 
could
be plastic”) then certainty is out of the question. What
if I pick the apple up, feel its weight and, more, cut into the cut into it revealing the
apple’s flesh? Surely 
this 
must be an apple, I must be justified in saying “now I k
now
this
is an apple.” Alas, the skeptic is again prepared: That is merely a lab-made facsimile of an
apple, possessed of nearly identical weight and texture but nonetheless not an apple —
apples grow on trees! If this, which from all angles appears to be an apple, which feels like
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an apple, has an apple’s flesh, and so on; if this is not an apple, then what is an apple?
Then what does it mean to be an apple? With this line of questioning I hope to highlight
some of the queerness present in the skeptic’s notion of what a ‘thing’ is, of what makes
an apple, an ‘apple,’ and not a lab-made facsimile. I hope to inject some hesitation into our
willingness to accept the conventional notion that object identity is black and white, apple
and not-apple, such that we might glean some of the haziness in the scaffolding of the
skeptic’s argument; such that the clean edges bounding the apple from the not-apple come
out of focus and begin to reveal a far more vaporous sense of what an ‘apple’ ‘is.’ While at
this point the intuition is inchoate at best, the strangeness of the skeptic’s answers as we
delve farther and farther down the rabbit hole of sensation and knowledge, prefigures the
discussion to come and relates where we will ultimately find the proverbial kink in the
skeptic’s armor.

2 The Lived-in World
In the course of clarifying the force of the skeptic’s argument and specifically the
sense of the certainty and knowledge that the skeptic seeks (that is, in clarifying what it is
that the skeptic thinks we lack when she says “we cannot be certain”), I hope to
demonstrate that the skeptic’s world is not the world we 
live 
in. And, though we have
seen it is possible for philosophical doubt to arise organically, that doubt arises out of a
muddled intuition for the workings of language. In the first pillar of this philosophical
project I will set out to undo the intuition that there exists an objectively stratified
external reality. That is, I will demonstrate the lack of sense in presuming ‘singularness’
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(objects, distinct entities, discreteness &c.) to exist in reality outside of human cognition; I
hope to clarify that ‘objects’ as distinct, singular entities are a powerful but ultimately
human construction and one that does not transpose onto the ‘external’ world.. To clarify
the emphasis here, I am working to show that the characteristic unity, singularity,
individuality, &c. of ‘objects’ is a function of the language that describes them — that is, I
will argue that identity (what makes the ‘apple’ an apple and not, say, a plastic replica)
does not inhere in the object (nothing about the apple itself individuates it from the
universe around it) but of the behavior, practice, and conventions of language use. This
may seem like an esoteric point at first, certainly the language I must resort to in
describing it is obscure, but the notion of a stratified external reality has its roots in
ancient history and remains pervasive today among realist schools of thought and is, as
we have seen in the skeptic’s argument, an unspoken assumption in a greater number still.
Plato’s forms jump to mind as an obvious example of the belief that, outside of human
perception, there exist ultimate Entities which transcend human perception. However a
far more subtle and troubling example lies in the still-pervasive ‘referential theory of
meaning’ which describes the relationship between language and the world as denotative;
the word is merely a tag placed onto some ‘thing’ that exists outside of the language that
describes it. Suffice it to say, the idea that there exists an external reality populated by
entities is monolithic, tacitly-accepted or intuited, and, as we shall see, woefully
misbegotten. The sense in which there exists an Objective Reality at all is, to some extent,
problematic, but the specific brand nonsense that I wish to highlight lies in the
characterization of an external reality composed of constituent 
parts
, of a world outside of
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language that is carved up into individual ‘things.’
On the surface it would appear that there is a sense in which the argument that I
will be making is its own kind of skepticism, perhaps even a more radical form than the
kind I wish to deconstruct. To answer this let us first look to Wittgenstein for a sense of
context. In his 
Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein paints a picture of language,
how we use it, and how the concept of ‘meaning’ is seated within the complex web of
those language games, that posits no 
theory 
of language. There is no, as has sometimes
been falsely attributed to him, ‘use theory of meaning.’ Rather, through a myriad of
ground-floor instances of language, Wittgenstein establishes an understanding of how a
language-speaking community, through convention and use, confers meaning — 
life
— to
the words that populate our language. Similarly, in this project I hope to consolidate a
sense of 
the way language works
; a sense of knowledge and certainty, of the 
concepts
of
‘knowledge’ and ‘certainty,’ of ‘objectivity’ and ‘perception,’ that diffuses some of the
mystery in language which impels the so-called “problems of philosophy.” Among the
problems and misconceptions that I wish to dissolve is the antiquated, platonic notion of
objects or concepts as existent external to the human mind or the activities
(meaning-making practices) of humanity. To construct a “theory” of perception, meaning,
or language would typically mean to propose a system that explains what meaning 
is
. In
his 
Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein compels us to understand that “theorizing,”
in this sense, is a misbegotten activity — a relic of Platonic essentialism and the attempt
to ‘get at’ the fundamental, underlying nature of things. This project is not an attempt to
formulate a theory about meaning or perception. Neither is it an opinion on the existence
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or non-existence of objective entities. “But wait!” you may, quite appropriately, be
thinking, “did he not just say precisely that?” Yes, and no — I will likely seem to
contradict myself with some frequency in the coming text but, as I will speak in greater
detail about later, there are constraints imposed by language that, simply because
language is the medium through which I must communicate, I am confined by. For the
moment I will briefly say that, yes, the picture of language that I wish to establish renders
the notion of fundamentally existent entities obsolete. And superficially the statement
‘there are no Objects in external reality’ is radically skeptical but in understanding the
full force of my argument we will see that what I am saying is the 
concept
of ‘objects’ does
not 
belong
in a discussion of the universe external to human cognition. That is, when
taken skeptically, the force of the claim imparts a kind of shock — that, to say this, is akin
to saying ‘when I close my eyes the universe stops existing’ or ‘we are all a figment of our
own imaginations’ or some equally strident, sententious nonsense. Rather, in establishing
how our meaning-making practices police and reform the boundaries of language use;
what ‘objects’ ‘are’; and a more ordinary, down-to-earth vision of perception, it ought to
be clear that talk of an entity that is bounded, distinct, individual &c. in some fundamental
way, is simply meaningless — ‘language on holiday.’
Both the skeptic and myself are, ultimately, making the claim that there is a kind of
certainty which is fundamentally unattainable. On this point, I do not fault the skeptic.
However, in concluding that the unreliability of sensation indicates a fundamental inability
for us to attain true knowledge, we are, along with the skeptic, made to lament this as a
profound loss. The intended force of the skeptical argument is something like, “alas, we
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can never have certainty at all but only belief.” The skeptic argues aptly that sensation
cannot get at the 
thing-itself
and so we can only ever infer, or place faith in, our sensation
based beliefs. The skeptic intimates a kind of ‘leap-of-faith’ that must be taken anytime we
place weight on our perceptions. I, too, argue that the kind of knowledge, the sense of
certainty, that the skeptic seeks is fundamentally unattainable but in contrast to the
skeptic, I hope to show that this is a meaningless conclusion. 
We do not live in the
skeptic’s world
. The skeptic fights perception in the quest to disprove certainty whereas I
believe that the skeptic is seeking such a peculiar kind of certainty, one that imports an
ultimately untenable ontology, that its loss carries no weight. Namely, for us to have the
kind of knowledge the skeptic wants is for us to know the thing-in-itself (as opposed to
merely having a sensory impression from which we guess at the thing-in-itself); this sense
of certainty necessitates the existence of a stratified external reality. This should not be
surprising, for there to exist things-in-themselves is for there to be things — individual,
bounded entities — independent of any human cognition or practice: An underlying,
objective universe composed of objective things, of things-in-themselves, that our sensory
perceptions only fallibly represent and (‘unfortunately’)7 do not 
get at
.
However, if the characteristic of ‘singularness,’ of being bounded — ‘one’ — is
itself of linguistic origin, if the unique sensory modalities and neurophysiological faculties
that humans have evolved, and so too the development of language based communication,
have resulted in the 
perception 
of a divided world but one that is not 
in-itself 
divided, then

7

This is the loss that the skeptic laments, this is the intended force of the skeptical argument and thus
too the precise place that my argument diverges. I argue against the possibility of ‘objects’ a
s singular entities
outside of language but only insofar as it is a linguistic impossibility — it is not a loss because there was never
anything to lose, 
per se.
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the skeptic’s argument has no ground to stand on. In the coming text we shall gestate on
the notion that our language games, including the practices and conventions surrounding
such philosophically laden terms as ‘knowledge’ and ‘certainty,’ have appropriate contexts
of employment and thus meaning that is deeply grounded in the customs and conventions
of the language-speaking community and 
not
some underlying or transcendent state of
affairs. To lose the kind of knowledge that the skeptic wants is only to lose grounding in
an already alien way of speaking — only to lose a sense devoid of context.

T
he skeptic desires that we conclude, in not having this 'certainty,' that we've lost
the 
ordinary 
sense of certainty. That is, rather than stretching a sense of certainty to its
breaking point and reconvening on a (not-objective, everyday, &c.) certainty, the intended
power of the skeptic’s argument resides in the implication that we have lost all certainty;
certainty generally; the possibility for certainty (in our day to day life) — he might say,
“We can only ever take leaps of faith! We are perpetually rolling the dice of idle
speculation as we proceed through life" However, the skeptic’s sense of certainty is highly
specialized, seeking something that our senses cannot in principle provide: Access to the
thing-in-itself. We cannot pull up the curtain past ‘mere’ perception to see the ultimate
constituents of reality (were there ultimate constituents of reality, objects-in-themselves)
with which the skeptic concludes the unattainability of certainty, as though we can so
thoughtlessly equate ‘perception of the thing in itself, knowledge of the objective state of
reality’ with the many and varied uses of ‘certainty.’ Further, as will be argued later in
this chapter, objects-in-themselves are a relic of essentialist and referentialist thinking and
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as such the sense of 'knowledge' cultivated by the skeptic is so specialized that it (and so
too, the loss of it) has no force. We have merely made transparent the vapidity of
Wittgenstein’s “language on holiday.”

3 A Sense of Certainty
In ordinary usage, both the question “Is there actually… ?” (“Is there actually
going to be a celebrity speaker at the convention?” “Is this actually your paper and not a
cleverly guised plagiarism?” &c.) as well as the statement “There is actually…” (“There is
actually no such thing as Santa Claus”) are justifiable, uncontroversial. Let us imagine
that, in her considerable comic genius, my housemate takes it upon herself to replace the
cups in our house with superficially identical objects that have holes in their bottoms and
hence cannot hold any liquid. For weeks following the incident, as she holds a cup out to
me, I cautiously ask “is that actually a cup?” My words are sensible and my question can
be answered sensibly. I am concerned that, while the object held out to me looks like a
cup, it might instead be (a cup with holes in it) a practical joke designed to spill water on
me. I use the word ‘actually’ because there is a sense in which the reliability of the
superficial characteristics of the object, the cup, has been called into question. In contrast
to the demonstrated, perpetually reinforced reliability of the many ‘identity judgments’8
we make on a daily basis, my roommate has forced me into a position of hesitation in my

8

Identity judgments needn’t be verbal, like “that is a cup,” in fact they far more realistically, and
commonly, take for in our behavior; in, for example, my pouring a liquid into what I am judging, assuming, &c.
to be a cup. When I ask a friend for a pencil and he reaches into his bag and hands me one, there are implicit
identity judgments being made and, as I do not correct his actions, I tacitly reinforce those judgments as
correct, reliable.
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cup-related judgments, at least while I’m at home.
This hesitation, this holding off from judgment, is a sensible, if temporary,
response to the antics of my roommate. The skeptic poses her problem as such: Here I am
skeptical, reluctant to judge, hesitant to act with certainty, &c. because I have been given
reason to doubt the reliability of the superficial characteristics of the cup as being
indicative of the object actually being a cup — the morphic qualities of the cup, in this
context, no longer reliably entail the identity of the cup, if instead I were given reason to
doubt the reliability of not just one identity judgment but rather the ascertainment of
identity generally then I would be compelled to carry this same hesitation, this wary
acknowledgement of the inconclusiveness of perceptory-judgment indiscriminately into
life.
The sense of certainty employed by the philosopher in the above thought exercise
relies on a notion of an underlying reality — when Plato asks “what is justice? (but what
is 
Justice
?)” he does not seek a definition or a context of appropriate use, rather he seeks
an 
essence
. Plato asks a different question than that of the curious child wondering what
“justice” means (to which the parent might respond “Justice is treating people fairly”) —
rather Plato, and a great many other philosophers, ask such questions with a very
peculiar, existential sense in mind. When the philosophical skeptic makes the claim that
there is a principled inadequacy in using our sensory perception of ‘X’ as the justification
for knowledge of ‘X’ she demonstrates an underlying, untenable assumption: That there is
some 
thing
, ‘X,’ beyond the boundaries of our perception. The skeptic does not mean to
say, for example, that “no, in this case, seeing isn’t good enough because actually X was a
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3-dimensional projection, you merely needed to reach out and touch it to know!” Rather,
the skeptic makes the claim that 
no
perceptory judgment would be adequate for, quite
simply: The perception of X — the image of X, the taste of X, the smell of X and so on —
is not X itself, does not entail X. We do not see beyond the veil. If we are missing
something, namely: ‘X,’ in not seeing beyond the veil, then the skeptic is unavoidably
making the claim that there is an ‘X’ “beyond the veil,” outside of perception, independent
of human consciousness, &c. Let this be the locus of the skeptic’s failing for it is precisely
this claim, that there exist objects in and of themselves, entities independent of human
cognition, that I refute, “
since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain”
(
PI,
126).

4 Lines in Language: The Regulation of Concepts
Within the frame of conscious experience we have come to categorize and classify
the world around us. Through my training with language, my training with music, &c. I
have come to intuitively perceive discrete entities within my environment; I look around
my room and see a chair, a bookshelf, a sleeping dog; I hear a song by Nick Drake, a
particular chord, in ¾ time. This capacity, while profound and worthy of discussion in its
own right, contributes fatally to an intuition that many of us carry — the chair, the song,
will go on being a chair and a song when I am no longer there, right? The seeming nature
of the objects in our world as hermetically sealed, ontologically distinct entities is an
intuitive but fully human construction. While sometimes an inconsequential assumption,
within the diaphanous territory of philosophical discourse the tacit presupposition of
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objects-in-themselves can carry ruinous weight.
Is the cup still a cup when no one is around to call it one? Does the fact that there
are currently, let me count, seventy-seven things in this room mean there are, objectively
seventy-seven objects in this room? The Eskimo, ostensibly due to the unique needs and
qualities of their arctic environment, have twelve words for snow. Peering out of a
window at a fresh snowfall, certain tribes of Eskimo may look at what we see as ‘snow,’
one thing, and instead see ‘aput’ and ‘qimuqsuq,’ two fully distinct entities. We would
neither say that this entails the human-independent existence of twelve different things
(which we happen to collate into ‘snow’), nor that the distinctions of identity which the
Eskimo make are false ‘really’ there is objectively just one thing, ‘snow’ — We must
avoid the trap of thinking that language reflects the objective contents of reality.
The ‘lines’ that we draw, the words that we create and use to relate our
experience, are not the result of an individual person but of an entire language speaking
community that enforces the boundaries of use of our concepts. A concept is not merely
the word but the entire system of use, misuse, connotation, association, regulation and so
on that all together gives 
life
to the concept. Language is a regulatory practice and the
boundaries of our concepts, which are the lines that ‘carve up our world,’ so to speak, only
exist insofar as they are policed and reinforced by the entire language speaking
community. The possible rightness and wrongness of our claims does not derive from, as
we have seen, their adherence to some underlying actuality, some ‘object-in-itself,’ but
rather is a product of the claim’s harmony or disharmony with the language speaking
community at large.
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Language, in providing humans with a lens through which we see the ‘carved up’
world (through which you see these 
words 
and not just squiggles of black ink), engenders
the dangerous intuition that there must exist objects outside of our conception of them;
objects in and of themselves. “Surely,” this intuition impels, “the fact that are a myriad of
distinct, singular things all around me,” the cup, glasses, computer, table, and so on, “is
not going to change if I were not here” Undoubtedly the room and its contents would not
somehow vanish upon our departure, this is not the force of our claim; rather we must ask
whether it still exists 
as
a room; whether the keys and cup on the desk still exist a
s
keys
and a cup, as 
separate entities
independent of human cognition. Is there something
fundamental about the cup that distinguishes it from its surroundings? Bounds it,
separates it from ‘the desk’? The items surrounding me have identity, they are individual,
one — were you to ask me for the cup I would not smash the cup and hand you a fragment
of glass — but this perceived unity does not inhere in the universe. The associations and
impressions that I have of sunglasses, their grammatical schematism in language, carve
them out and make them 
‘one.’ 
Their identity, their one-ness, comes not from some
vaporous ‘actuality,’ but from consciousness and the meaning making practice of
language.

5 Becoming a Rock
We call these hard, often jagged things “rocks” though there is nothing that
inheres in them which conveys the phonetically arbitrary “rock.” What would it mean for
there to be some 
thing
that the rock objectively is (onto which the name “rock” is merely a
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tag)? That is, when the skeptic intimates the distinction between the perception and the
thing-perceived (the image and the actuality, &c.), what would it mean for there to be
such mind-independent entities; for reality outside of human consciousness to be stratified,
composed of individual things? If there are ultimate constituents of reality which beget the
identity, unity, ‘one-ness,’ &c. of our words (“rock,” “cup”) and the objects chained to
them then let us seek it out. If there is some essence of ‘rockness’ from which the rock
derives its identity or some ultimate building block of reality that is fundamentally 
one
,
objectively individuated, then let us try to find it.
The rock is an amalgam of elements crystallized, eroded, smashed together and,
ultimately, culminated in the rock. For there to be some objective thing that a rock 
is
, then
we ought to be able to triangulate that essence of ‘rockness’ by examining the transition
from what is plainly not a rock to what definitively is. The amalgam of sand, gravel, &c.
is certainly not a rock, while the final state of the rock certainly is: If there is some
essence of ‘rockness,’ if the rock is objectively a rock and its identity, its one-ness, is not
merely a human construction, then we should be able to ascertain that identity by
examining how the lava, gravel, sand, &c. ‘become a rock.’ Were we to investigate what it
means for something to be alcoholic by examining a number of different beverages,
non-alcoholic and alcoholic; were we to watch as a glass of soda goes from non-alcoholic
to alcoholic as whiskey is poured into the glass, or tonic as gin is mixed in, we would
discover some commonality to all of these instances of ‘alcoholic’ that is missing in all
instances of ‘non-alcoholic,’ and in examining the transition of a beverage from one to the
other we clearly see that indeed, surprisingly, it is the alcohol which makes the beverage
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alcoholic. In this vein, if there is some essence or ultimate object that manifests the rock’s
identity (that makes the rock a rock and not, say, sand) then let us attempt a similar
triangulation of such an essence or ultimate property. A perhaps unnecessary
foreshadowing: If instead the identity of the rock, the cup, or a game, does not correspond
to some essence that transcends perception, is not manifest from an objective constituent
of reality ‘hidden from view,’ but rather is the far more ordinary consequence of “family
resemblance” then we will find our search both fruitless and misguided.
If we were to watch a timelapse of sand or mineral gradually coalescing into a rock
and point out the moment when it is no longer sand but now rock, we would find no divine
objectivity in our judgment – instead we find a nebulous, intersubjective9 intuition that
guides us to a vaporous, desultory conclusion. The act of calling out a moment as the
transition from not-a-rock to a-rock is fully interpolative. We would say with certainty
that at first there is no rock, and at the end there is a rock, but the ‘moment of
instantiation,’ as it were, would be nowhere to be found. Or, if found, the moment would
vary from person to person, thus providing no insight into what makes the rock ‘a rock.’
There is no a-priori line through which the rock passes from being layers of slowly
eroding and compressing earth into what we see as rock-dom. The boundaries of identity
are organic, of human origin, often bearing only family resemblance, and manifest through

9

By “intersubjective” here I mean to say that our understandings of words, what they ‘mean’ to each
of us, how they are grammatically schematized for each of us, is both unique and shared. There is an important
subjectivity to our individual lexicons insofar as every individual has a fully idiosyncratic natural history, a
unique ‘training with language’ that shapes and inflects their understandings of every concept populating their
idiolex. That said, there is also important overlap in our understandings of words that results from the
regulatory practices of language: the conventions, customs, and traditions, that shape how we learn and use
language enable the our effective communication. If we all had radically unique lexicons which little or no
commonality the entire enterprise of effective communication would be undermined.
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the learning, teaching, and policing of our language.

6 Seeking Certainty
Does this mean then that we are wrong in our certainty? That we ought not claim
'to know’ that at first there is no rock and that at the end there is a rock? Perhaps we are
fully justified in being ‘certain’ about there not being a rock and then, later, being a rock,
perhaps instead the problem lies in the notion that there is some underlying actuality by
virtue of which the “rock” is a rock, some essence beneath the surface of perception that
gives the rock identity. If the rock is a rock not with reference to objective reality, but
rather because of the deep grammatical schematism of ‘rock’ through our training with
language, then there is no problem in our not finding an objective transition from
‘non-rock’ to ‘rock;’ there would be no essence of rockness objectively because everything
that a rock ‘is,’ what ‘rock’ ‘means,’ would be in plain sight and publicly available. The
ambiguity of identity that seems to be implied in relinquishing ourselves from the grasp of
referential meaning appears problematic (“How then can we have real Truth if there is no
stratified objective reality?”). Language, unlike math or science, is an informal system—a
system that warrants adaptation and reform, a form of life that is policed, regulated, but
not so unyieldingly as in the context of mathematics or, for example, chess.
It is readily available, plainly evident, that our words function effectively. We can
speak of ‘truth,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘certainty’ in a variety of contexts with full
understanding. To frame the question of ‘truth’ differently, let us look to J.L. Austin.
Austin inquires about the truth of the statement “France is hexagonal.” He writes that, to
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the war general who needs a vague sense of the geography of France in order to formulate
appropriate orders to his men, “France is hexagonal” is a perfectly acceptable
characterization of France’s shape and thus, to the general, the statement is true. On the
other hand, Austin writes, the cartographer who is precisely mapping the entire region
would call the claim “rough” at best and perhaps even “totally false.” What Austin
intends to highlight by this is the tremendous importance of 
context
in evaluating the
meaning of a statement, in 
understanding
the statement. In one situation the claim is true,
in another it is false, but more to the point: it’s 
complicated
. The claim may be rough,
vague, vaporous, &c.; the claim may be an attempt to get under someone’s skin; the claim
might be a part of a memorization exercise — The ‘meaning’ of the claim is no simple
thing and the attempt to reduce it, to generalize about it, to extricate its so-called “truth
value” is an absurdly, uniquely philosophical mistake. This point, the contextual
complexity of meaning, is essential for it shows us not only another sense in which the
attempt to generalize meaning, or ‘get at’ the Truth, is faulty, but also provides us with
picture of the way that the ordinary concepts of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘certainty,’ and so on
fully retain their sense and weight despite the nonexistence of the skeptic’s general,
idealized sense of ‘knowledge.’ I will reiterate that this is the place where the skeptic and
I deviate. The skeptic concludes that, as we cannot have the knowledge, the certainty, she
seeks, our capacity for certainty and knowledge 
generally
is undermined. Whereas I
recognize the unattainability of this ‘knowledge’ only as an inability to employ an already
alien concept. Truth and knowledge are regularly employed competently in a context
sensitive way, and regulated by stringent conventions and customs of the
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language-speaking community. To lose the skeptic’s sense of certainty is to lose very little
after all.

7 A Batty Language
We can imagine an exceptionally intelligent species of bat that has evolved its own
language which, hypothetically, is as sophisticated as our own. The bats in this scenario
sleep under the branches of what we roughly call “trees.” Imagine now that these bats,
within their own language, refer to the trees as “nukkol.” The bat word for the tree
identifies in our environment many of the same things, or kinds of things, that our word
“tree” does, but it does 
not 
identify the exact same thing. The bat word “nukkol” may, for
example, imbue the qualities (in approximately comparable human words) of ‘tall’ and
‘safe’ and ‘shelter.’ While the human concept ‘tree’ is grammatically schematized such
that ‘wood,’ ‘tall,’ and ‘hard’ are all tangentially related concepts. This is, of course, a
dramatic oversimplification of both concepts but the idea is that as a human we may
recognize things as trees that a bat would not and vice-versa. The point of this example is
to illustrate from a different angle that our concepts, and what those concepts mean, are
by no means referential.
The referential theorist posits that meaning is denotative, that the word is a link
onto a thing in the world — thus, “tree” simply means the wooden pillars we happen to
call trees, and “nukkol” would likely be conflated to mean the same. Clearly, though, the
meaning of each is far more complex — our words carry their weight only as they are
seated within the vast and intricate web of our language and thus do not, as it were,
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simply contain determinate, definitional meaning. This is analogous to the way that
scribbles on a page do not carry intrinsic, absolute-meaning: They only carry the weight
of meaning when understood, when someone with a particular background reads them and
even then that meaning may range widely from person to person. To a young child they
may literally be scribbles, while to another slightly more linguistically developed reader
they may discernibly be words strung together but that are not yet recognizable, and to
yet another who actually speaks the language the words may represent a scene in a play.
Meaning, in this sense, is constructive just as, relatedly, object-hood is.
Even though both bat and human can go into a forest and point to the same ‘object’
and say “nukkol” and “tree” respectively, a human may see a bonsai plant and call it a
“tree” where the bat would not use the word “nukkol” at all because clearly the bonsai
could not serve as a shelter for it. The constitution of our definitions of tree or nukkol are
contingent on our (as well as our species as a whole) use of and experience with them,
there is nothing about the thing that is tree’y or nukkol’y which makes us or the bats use
those words for them. The bat, too, may look at a streetlamp and call it “nukkol” because
it falls into the bat’s grammatical schematism for ‘nukkol’ as a tall, potential shelter. Were
we to dissect the tree, peeling off bark and splitting wood to 
really 
see it, to find its
essence, to find that which makes it a ‘tree,’ we would obviously be being foolish. The
identity of the object does not reside outside of our construction of it linguistically and
with the possession of these words, with the individuating lens provided by language, we
tend to assume a more basic identity that. In understanding that our word ‘tree’ does not
correspond to some essence of tree-ness, in understanding the picture of language I hope
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to consolidate in this project, we may avoid many of the linguistic road-bumps, like
skepticism, that trouble philosophers of a more referential mind.

8 Tapestry
Let’s imagine for a moment a two dimensional plane, extending in all directions,
which to us appears to be a tapestry filled with washes of color. Given our unique
neurophysiologies and sensory modalities we see a plane full of seemingly arbitrary,
varied colors that gradate into one another such that there are no boundaries, no blocks of
color, just an unbounded phantasmagoria of overlapping, interwoven color. Now let us
consider an intelligent species that exists solely on this plane, living out their hypothetical
lives on this tapestry. We can imagine then that the colors of the tapestry hold real-world
significance to the creatures inhabiting it, that, for example, the gradient that emerges
where red and green intersect constitutes a potentially fatal trap for the inhabitants while
the more blue the area is the more sustenance the creatures can derive. That is, the
creatures of the tapestry live and die, survive or perish, within and because of the
environment that they occupy. Thus we can also imagine that over the course of centuries
spent on the tapestry the creatures have evolved powerfully functional sensory modalities
in response to their environment.
The creatures have evolved the capacity to clearly individuate the contents of their
world; they can literally 
taste 
the suppliers of sustenance or nutrition, they can 
see
the
places of peril in their world, they can f
eel 
the need for nourishment or a threat to their
survival. The unique sensory modalities they have developed through the long term
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dialogue of body and environment allow these creatures to distinguish individual things in
their environment, they perceive (our equivalent of) food, they see distinct ‘traps’ and
threats to their survival. Their world, that is, is stratified, full of individual entities that,
as a matter of survival, the creatures have evolved to see and interact with. What to us
appear to be nebulous washes seemingly random colors are, to the creatures, richly
populated ecosystems and environments constituted by distinct entities that have direct
bearing on the survivability of the creatures. But then, what is 
really
there? Is the
tapestry made up of a nebula of colors, unbounded and indiscrete, or is it constituted by a
constellation of entities? Surely, we must answer, neither! The question is faulty, to us the
tapestry is most certainly a wash of color and to the creatures the tapestry is
unambiguously populated by a myriad of things — For us to ask what it is 
really
is to
seek definitional, determinate meaning, to look for the object in itself, instead of seeing
that there is no objective ‘Truth’ to what the tapestry contains for its contents are the
product, and construction, of the uniquely developed, language-using community that
observes it.
To clarify with a final experiment, let us imagine a canvas on a wall that, to you
and I, is uniformly yellow. Now, consider a succession of species with extremely similar
but slightly different sensory modalities from humans. A member from each species looks
upon the canvas and sees something different. The first sees nearly what we see but
darker, as shade of orange. The next sees a distinct red while each individual onward sees
purple, blue, teal, green, and brown respectively. Is it sensible for us to ask, “What color
is it really?”
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9 Constraints of Language
It is here worth noting that I am certainly not saying “the rock (color, snow)
doesn’t exist 
as
a rock objectively” only to have us then default to ‘atoms,’ or ‘strings,’
&c. Rather, in this we can feel the constraints of language. We should say that the atoms
too are not somehow objectively singular entities, that at the level of vibrating quantum
strings we would see no divine line around certain clumps of strings separating them from
other clumps, but this would be defaulting to ‘strings’ as the somehow ontologically
distinct ‘things’. We might say that the atoms are not objectively distinct, that viewed as
a field of fluctuating energy it would be clear that there are no objective lines drawn
around what we, through our training with language, see as discrete ‘atoms’ — but again
we would then be privileging the ultimate existence of ‘energy’ which, too, is antithetical
to the understanding of language here proposed. These are the constraints of language;
we cannot convey the intuition of a thing not existing without somehow referencing other
things and sinking into a futile recursivity. It is rather difficult to speak of the
nonexistence of something outside of language while using talking about a nonexistent
‘
something
.’
The only reality we have access to is the reality of our experience, the reality of
perception shaped by language, and the objects of that reality only exist 
as 
objects (as
singular entities) through our training with language. These hard, often jagged things are
“rocks” despite the fact that there is nothing about this or that clump of molecules that is
hermetically sealed, nothing about the rock that objectively individuates itself from the
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trillions of molecules all around it. The rock — due to its characterization in language, its
schematism in my personal lexicon — has identity and so to me, and those who share my
language (who share similar language training), feels singular, contained, is an 
object
; but,
were we somehow to view the rock and its surroundings at an atomic level, we would not
so casually individuate; we would not presume identity. The rock has no objective identity,
no essence that pulls it from its surroundings and makes it a singular entity; there is no
divine line around what we call the rock separating it from the ground around it — we
humans draw the line in language. Identity is a form of life as much as language, the
diverse cultural history, personal connotations, environmental context, sensory modalities,
&c. together give rise to the object and so too the ‘thing’ evolves, fluctuates, births new
‘things,’ becomes antiquated, extinguished, and so on.
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II. Perception and Technique

1 Beginnings
Beyond his discussion of how words are used, Wittgenstein also provides a detailed
discussion of their functions, aims, and purposes. With these varied locutions
Wittgenstein urges a more general sense of the part that expressions play in language,
and thus that the mastery of a language consists in being able to employ its vast repertoire
of expressions in the profoundly nuanced and varied language-games that they belong in.
Given this constantly reaffirmed sense of contextual complexity it is unsurprising that the
concept of use be so broad as to defy any singular theory could hoping to encompass it.
But here, Wittgenstein offers, we want to object — “‘You take the easy way out! You talk
about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a
language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and
what makes them into language or parts of language’”.10 Wittgenstein likens this pursuit,
this desire for generality or essential definition, to somebody trying to explain what a
‘game’ is, trying to uncover or extricate the very essence of a game — the thing by which
all games 
are
games.

Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games,
ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? — Don't say: "There must be
something common, or they would not be called 'games' "-but look and see whether there is anything

10

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, §65. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print.
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common to all. — For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.11

In moving between particular instances of games and observing how multivalent
and variegated they are (“Don’t think, but look!”)12 , he demonstrates that while there is
undoubtedly continuity among games, common characteristics, the most we could
reasonably say 
of the entire lot 
is that they share a kind of ‘family resemblance.’ “We see a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall
similarities ... I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than
"
family resemblances
"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build,
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc”.13 The accumulation of particular
instances of language-use exemplifies Wittgenstein’s creed that “problems,” in philosophy,
“are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long
been familiar with” 14 — rather than construct linguistic formulae in an attempt to uncover
some essential quality, we must consolidate and observe what is already in plain view in
order to clear away confusion and misunderstanding.
Before moving into our own examination of language — which will take shape as
an inquiry into what kind of thing (or things) our training with language is, and how this
training is embodied, manifest, present, &c. in our everyday life — let us first offer an
account of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on rule-following, as well as a discussion of his
notion of ‘understanding.’ In terms of the preceding chapter, the distinction between the

11
12
13
14

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. P
hilosophical Investigations
, §66. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953. Print.
Investigations

, §66.
Investigations

, §66 - 67.
Investigations

, §109
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two paradigms of rule-following (the then-traditional calculus conception and the
Wittgensteinian “mastery of a technique”) that we will discuss follows the same lines as
the that between referential and so-called “ordinary” conceptions of language. Further, we
will see that the convergence of Wittgenstein’s notions of rule-following and
understanding provides fertile ground for an expansion of his thought into the territory of
perception generally which, at length, ought to clear away the type of misunderstanding15
endemic to epistemological and skeptical discourse. First, however, we must preface our
descent into rules and their practice by highlighting the distinction between
Wittgenstein’s earlier work, as seen in the 
Tractatus
, and his later views in P
hilosophical
Investigations
.

2 Denotative Links in Early Wittgenstein
In his first work, the 
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus,Wittgenstein’s position was
that, seated within the kaleidoscope of ordinary language, there exists an essential,
underlying logic that can be excavated through a structural analysis of the relationship
between language and the world. Wittgenstein called this (the relationship between
language and the world) a ‘picturing’ relation, and it took form, to summarize, as a
denotative link between words and objects. Thus, in the 
Tractatus
, the meaning of a word
was constituted with reference to the object it ‘pointed’ to; in this view names 
mean
objects. In Wittgenstein’s transitional phase, as articulated in 
The Blue and Brown Books,
he inquires anew “What is the meaning of a word?” The reiteration of this question,

15

Chapter 1, on ‘skepticism’
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supposedly answered in his 
Tractatus,signifies the beginning of the doubt felt toward his
earlier work and thus a dramatic turning point in his understanding of language and
philosophical methodology. Note that the following example quoting Augustine on
language learning is not meant to equate the views of 
Tractatus
-Wittgenstein with
Augustine but rather simply because it is a good example and, as Wittgenstein readily
provides, is mistaken in many of the same ways that his own ‘picturing relation’ account
of meaning is. At the beginning of the I
nvestigations
Wittgenstein calls upon Augustine to
precisely articulate the position that he will be retaliating against:

When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw
this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out.
Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples:
the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone
of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus,
as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to
understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used
them to express my own desires.16

By showing ostensively that a word corresponds to an object, Augustine explains,
he learns the word. While certainly there are instances of being taught the name of an
object through ostension, as is often the case with second language learners, Wittgenstein
(post-
Tractatus
) argues that this view, this t
heory
, is an ultimately insufficient account of
both the method by which we learn language and the constitution of meaning. Just as the
attempt to unify all games under single banner — i.e. “someone wins and someone loses”
— falls flat (“what about ‘waiting games?’”), so too is Augustine’s derivation of ostensive
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learning an impermissibly sparse representation of language training generally. Under
Augustine’s view, and in line with Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus
position, meaning is equated
with the object; “cup” means cup because the word 
denotes
the thing.
The denotative picture of language posits that, whatever the mechanism for the
acquisition of language, its contents correspond to pieces of the world and the function of
our locutions is to communicate that correspondence such that, by adhering to the
grammar, conventions, definitions, &c. of the language we 
mean
— proper conjugation
and syntax in tandem with the appropriate concepts results in ‘meaning,’ in a s
ensible
utterance in much the same way that the terms and syntax of a mathematical equation
result in an ‘answer.’ The stringent rules of mathematics legislate that in the equation
‘5+2 = x,’ x 
must 
be (‘mean’) 7 — the mathematical items, ‘5’, ‘+’, ‘2’, and ‘=’ combine
to form a mathematical sentence which has a determinate meaning that can be derived
univocally through the methodological adherence to the ‘grammar’ of mathematics. So too,
under the Augustinian and early Wittgensteinian position, does the combination of words
in this sentence, applied in accordance with the essential logic of language, have a
determinate meaning. It is worth noting that, while there may be 
ad hoc
exceptions, the
denotative or referential picture of language generally holds ‘made up’ utterances as fully
devoid of meaning. The homeless man yelling nonsense at me from across the street 
did
not mean
anything

—

he could not! His words had no referents and hence were vacuous
— whereas I thought it meant “time to walk away,” and “this man is mentally unwell,” or
maybe “you got a cigarette?”
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3 Truth and Objectivity in Late Wittgenstein
In stark contrast, Wittgenstein begins 
The Blue and Brown Books b
y carefully
dismantling the question of meaning, the 
general
question of meaning. By consolidating an
understanding of the work language does in specific contexts, Wittgenstein demonstrates
that, to ask generally about the meaning of a word, is to take ‘language on holiday.’ In
specific contexts we are capable of plainly viewing the meaning of words, but when we
attempt to analyze an expression and its ‘nature,’ in a vacuum, isolated from their natural
context, we lose sight of the expression and the ways that the language did its work. “The
confusions which occupy us,” Wittgenstein writes, “arise when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work”.17
To return to Austin’s example in his essay 
Truth
, if we ask whether the statement
“France is hexagonal” is true, we must realize that such an investigation must be
contextually seated: For the purposes of a war general dispersing his troops and
determining possible routes &c. the statement is true — for his purposes, yes, “France is
hexagonal.” However, for the cartographer mapping the span from the Mediterranean Sea
to the English Channel, “France is hexagonal” would likely be met with indignation. It is
at best a rough approximation. However this too is only part of the story; in both cases
there are a great many ways of understanding and conveying truth within such contexts
as ‘a general commanding his troops’ or ‘a cartographer mapping the terrain of Western
Europe’ and no one of them can be determinately derived from its originating expression
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alone; much less can such a derivation be taken as a general principle of ‘Truth.’ Whether
the statement is true, for the general or the cartographer, is almost besides the point —
truth and falsity are just two concepts among a great many possibly more suitable
concepts. To name a few: practical, approximate, rough, dangerous, efficient, &c. are in
many ways far more valuable characterizations of the statement in its specific context.
Now we want to say, “Well, perhaps we can permit truth (the word ‘truth’) to
have different inflections in different contexts, but surely there when scientists debate the
truth of a theory they are not squabbling over (“mere”) semantics, they are trying to
determine which corresponds to the universe!” But is this any different? Undoubtedly the
eidolon of science has reached a profound apotheosis in recent decades but should we
consider the context of science to somehow transcend contextualization? The highly
specialized language games of scientific enterprise are no less a context than that of
soccer, or cooking, or a student in class. There is certainly something peculiar about the
regulatory practices
of the scientific community, the conventions to which they adhere,
which ultimately engender a methodological and revisional rigorousness that we often
default to as “the success of science.” But, we might ask, if stringent conventions alone
are not enough to account for the truth, applicability, consistency, &c. of science, what is
it that grounds the regulation? If there is no sense in ‘objective truth’ then what 
is
the
truth of science? With reference to what does science qualify its theories?
In the previous chapter I made a show of why objects-in-themselves do not exist;
here again we are given to wonder, if science is a map onto the so-called real, then is my
denial of ultimately-existent things a dismissal of science — or, for example, of the atoms
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on which Atomic Theory so heavily relies? Does the nonexistence of things-in-themselves
stand to contradict String Theory because the theory posits the existence of ‘strings’?
When I argue for the lack of sense in objective entities I am arguing against an often
presupposed narrative that can have philosophically damaging implications. There is an
important difference between the denial of a theory that makes use of the concept of
bounded-entities and the denial of the position that those entities transcend the theory, the
scientist, and the community, to exist unto themselves alone. I would not deny the success
or applicability of mathematics because (excluding Category Theory) it utilizes a notion of
discreteness, whether in points, sets, or numbers; however, the arguments of the previous
chapter 
do 
stand against the notion of Mathematical Platonism which posits the existence
of such entities outside of our field of mathematics, outside of human cognition, in the
objective world.
At the risk of redundancy let us reexamine the idea of things-in-themselves. The
physical concept of discreteness is natural to us as we readily consider the world to be
composed of pieces. A great deal could be said about why individuation is a part of our
conscious experience, about how a world of objects is a place that can be described in
causal terms, about how perceptory distinctions facilitate mental representation, allowing
the cognitive power of planning and abstraction — but this would be idle speculation and
is unrelated to the present argument. When I hold up a stick in each hand we can
intuitively describe this as two sticks, two entities, but to say this discreteness inheres in
the object-itself rather than the tremendously complicated web of language, person,
culture, history, community, and so on, is a very different claim. A broken stick is now
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two sticks — in the moment of breaking, as fibers snapped past one another, where was
the moment they became two distinct things? I suppose it would be the moment when the
last fiber was pulled asunder, thus separating the one into two. And if there was a piece of
gum someone had placed on the stick, precisely at the place where the final fibers snapped,
such that the stick was now held together only by the gum, would this be one or two
objects (not including the gum)? Well, I’d think two because the gum is a different
material. And what if it was not a piece of gum but rather a perfectly placed piece of wood
inserted precisely such that the stick was never not in contact with more wood as it broke,
is it now one stick or does should we say it must be from the original tree, or that it must
have 
grown
together, or…
The problem of objects-in-themselves is peculiar given our many daily interactions
with objects; we constantly navigate our lives under the assumption of objects — this is
not wrong! Objects certainly 
do exist
in an ordinary sense, it is only the peculiar,
philosophical context of generalizable or objective things that the language “goes on
holiday,” it is what Austin would call “a distortion.”18 The regress of ad hoc answers
should be an indication of the queerness of such a line of questioning. Similar to “What is
the meaning of a word?” the philosophical emphasis of the question “When does the stick
(
really
) become two sticks (
objectively
)?” pulls the language out of context to a place
where it can no longer do work. In real life, if (for whatever reason) I were actually asked
when this stick became two sticks, I would say “when it broke in half,” and this would be
a perfectly satisfactory answer just as “the definition” would be an adequate if vaguely

18

See page 115 in 
Other Minds
for a discussion of distortions in language.
Austin, J. L. P
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, 115 Oxford: Clarendon, 1961. Print.
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reductive response to the former question. The “engine idling” in Wittgenstein’s
metaphor, reflects the attempt to pull the word or expression out from its specific context
(where the language actually does its work) and evaluate it generally, thus creating the
puzzle which confuses us into ultimately wondering not just about the truth of the
particular statement but indeed “What Truth 
is
?” generally.
There are no atoms-in-themselves or strings-in-themselves but this does nothing to
devalue the practical effectiveness or even (in an
ordinary 
sense) the truth of the theory.
The atoms are a useful construct just as the numbers are to math — in math there are
even theories which circumvent the need for discrete objects (Category Theory, for
example) and so too in the twentieth century scientists shed the idea that atoms where the
ultimate constituents of matter but rather were themselves a conglomerate. But let us not
now make the mistake of thinking, “Oh, so then it’s just 
electrons 
objectively” — It is
turtles all the way down.

For there to be, as is the commonplace view in certain circles, an essential notion of
truth — as opposed to a polysemous concept that is situated within the intricacies of
particular language games and among whom there is merely a family resemblance — is
for there to be an objective state of affairs in the world, the ‘Real’, that our expressions
are true by virtue of; true 
with reference 
to. An objective, essential notion of truth
mandates objective, essential correlates to the things that are true; for the statement
‘there is an apple on my desk’ to be true in some objective sense, there must be some
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fundamental, transcendent thing (that we call an apple) which is on top of some
fundamental entity that we call “desk” — there must exist 
objects-in-themselves
. We have
seen that the referential picture of language also posits a denotative link between words
and the ‘things in the world’ to which they correspond. The propensity to seek generality,
to grasp for an essential meaning, while understandable, defies the far more interesting
and diverse reality of ordinary language and precludes the task of philosophy by muddling
the ground with language on holiday. “Philosophy,” Wittgenstein writes, “is a struggle
against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language.”19

4 Rule Following
In his 
Philosophical Investigations
Wittgenstein was concerned with repudiating a
particular view of rule following that treated rules and their applications as a kind of
calculus. Among his many qualms with the theory, the traditional ‘calculus’ perspective
held that, to follow a rule, there must be some kind of conscious or unconscious
acquiescence to said rule. To move a pawn forward in chess, that is, is to act in
accordance with and in reference to the rules constraining the pawns movement. The idea
of a word, rule, image, &c. being ‘held before one’s mind’ when engaging in
language-games is returned to repeatedly throughout the 
Investigations
and here in the
context of rule following this privacy is particularly problematic for Wittgenstein. Not
only, he argues, is this occult notion of rule following a relic of a of cartesian dualism but
further the calculus conception views rules as l
egislative 
over our action. Wittgenstein
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acknowledges that the rules may serve as a ‘guide’ insofar as our training with rules often
(but not always) constitutes an initial template or methodology for their employment, but
the idea that they are 
necessarily
before one’s mind when acting in accordance with them
is, for Wittgenstein, a doomed-to-fail attempt to ‘get at’ the essence of the activity of rule
following. In seeing rules as legislative, the calculus-theorists facilitate the admittance of
objective standards of correctness. While certainly there is a standard of correctness in
our language use, we will see that it does not mysteriously transcend the language-using
community. Wittgenstein argues that our training with rules is public and our application
of rules within language games is manifest. By understanding rule following as an activity
instead of a calculus we can begin to approach the topic of language training.
Wittgenstein provides an account of meaning, rule-following, and understanding,
that clears away many misunderstandings regarding the role of mental content in
language use. By examining Wittgenstein’s depiction of understanding as “the mastery of
a technique”20 it is made clear that our words are not like keys that unlock mental content,
(or ‘meaning’, as construed by Augustine); our words are not understood after their
utterance (after ‘examining the mental content contained within’) but 
with
their utterance.
"Just for once,” Wittgenstein pleads, “don't think of understanding as a 'mental process'
at all! - For that is the way of talking which confuses you.” Our words are not strung
together with constant mental reference to the rules of the language. Wittgenstein
inquires broadly about our capacity to follow rules (grammatical and otherwise): "'How
am I able to follow a rule?' - If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the
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justification for my acting in this way in complying with the rule." How then are we
capable of acting “this way” in accordance with the system’s rules and regulations, both
formal and informal? Our words are uttered with the relevant background of our training,
the intuition for language use hence developed, which provides the shape of our usage.
Thus, in speaking ‘as a proficient English speaker’ the meaning of my words is not a
mysterious second entity lying before one’s mind but is plainly manifest to us, in the
words uttered (written) in the particular context of their utterance, with the relevant
backgrounds of being proficient language users. Wittgenstein entices us, "But isn't chess
defined by rules? And how are these rules present in the mind of someone who intends to
play chess?".21 The intuition that the rules of chess and the chess player’s actions are
divorceable; the intuition that an utterance can be divorced from the understanding of it is
no more sensible than proclaiming that we see the sense-data of the cup in front of us
before seeing ‘the cup’ itself. We cannot speak of the passive registration of sensory
information and then of the qualitative experience inspired by it any more than we can
sensibly talk about seeing the squiggles of ink before seeing the word.

5 Understanding ‘Understanding’
The private picture of rule following arises out of the perception that rules
uniformly underlie language thus provide objective standards of correctness — another
reflection of the idea that though language coheres to the objective structure of the world.
Wittgenstein argues instead that rule following arises out of the customs and conventions
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of the language-speaking community and hence that the act of rule following is not
internal but public, manifest in the use of language. The proficient chess player is not
coerced into particular choices by the rules, rather they shape his understanding of the
game and are manifest in how he navigates it. To “look” rather than “think,” as
Wittgenstein earlier pled, let us imagine the progression, the training, of a soccer player.
The nascent soccer player initially spends a great deal of time and effort simply
‘getting a feel’ for the ball, for moving in tandem with the ball, for making it go where he
wants it to, for not tripping over it. He fosters the development of the relevant muscles
and begins to make the relevant neural paths and connections, the muscle memory. At
some point he learns the rules of the game and, for a time, must make reference to them.
That is, in the beginning he may sometimes remind himself of the rules in order to
navigate the game successfully, he may reflexively want to pick up the ball but in
considering this he recalls that only the goalie has this privilege. But other times, the
player will forget the rules entirely, or the relevant ones; he may run the ball out of
bounds or pass it to the wrong team.
It is not an official rule that you cannot pass to the other team but there are a great
many events and operations within the game that have consequences detrimental to your
goals as a player — it is often just as damaging (to the objective of winning the game) to
pass to the opposing team as it is to run out of bounds and provide the opposing team with
the ball that way. But the effects of the player’s actions, of his running the ball out of
bounds, of kicking and scoring a goal, of kicking and missing the goal, as well as the
effects of his teammates actions, together constitute a multitude of micro-alterations and
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inflections to the player’s understanding of the game, of his role within it, and how to
navigate it. Now ultimately the player has etched the many rules, both formal and
informal, into the pathways of his brain; he has acquired a reflexive understanding of
soccer and so too, cultivated a kind of working intuition for ‘how to play soccer’ — He is
like the ship’s captain who after decades on the sea, is able to navigate the ceaseless
unpredictability of the ocean while keeping his crew safe and reaching a destination.
Certainly there are times when both the player and the captain have to plan or deliberate,
there are moments where abstraction is necessary and moments when explicitly consulting
one’s memory of rules is vital (planning a complicated play without violating the ‘offsides’
rule, for example). But soon the soccer player has “mastered a technique,” rarely making
explicit mental reference to his training anymore, he has been conditioned by it.
Wittgenstein wrote that, “To understand a sentence means to understand a
language” and “To understand a language means to have mastered a technique”22 — just
as the proficient listener understands the sentence without (typically) any interior mental
reference, the soccer player has consolidated a wealth of experience, of training, that has
engendered an understanding of the game and so too of “the sentence:” of the game at any
given moment. As we have seen the training is not nearly so simple as reading the rule
book until it is memorized. The soccer player must learn the relevant functions and
variations of his body within the system of the game; he must acquire an intuition not just
for 'staying within bounds' but also for how hard to kick, and when, and where on the
ball, and from what distance, all based on the relevant context of the opponents around
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him, the teammates nearby, where the goalie presently is, and finally entrenched in the
idiosyncratic anatomy and competencies of the player himself, and so duly attached to his
particular likes and dislikes, challenges and obstacles, personal agenda, ego, &c. This is
not to say that the player is making constant reference to the aforementioned facets of his
training (he usually does not contemplate how or why his last kick went awry before
making his next) in order to act in the game; rather, in acquiring this intuition, the
mastery of this technique, he 
understands
the game around him23 and hence navigates it
aptly in light of his training. And, in case this has not been made clear, one does not
suddenly, after sufficient practice ‘get’ the mastery. Training, understanding, and
technique, are not black and white — they are, of course, gradual processes and the
understanding, the intuition for navigating the games, is ever-evolving.
The player’s training, and that was by no means an exhaustive characterization of
it, cannot be reduced to the rule book or a set of drills without massive blindness to
relevant information; and thus the understanding too (of the game at any given time, and
hence how to act in it), is accordingly irreducible. Our training with language is no
different: growing up, listening, speaking, reading, learning, playing, arguing, and
countless such events and activities and interactions are all constitutive of our training
with language. When we speak, we do not ordinarily make explicit access to our training
and, when we listen, we do not ordinarily understand by mentally referencing our
training. Rather, we perceive and act in the light of my training (and thus, in perceiving,
understand).

23

To this effect, the player understands the game around him in the same way that you are capable of
understanding the words that you are currently reading.
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6 Regulation
Like the game of soccer, language is a form of life which we cannot grasp in
totality in each passing moment of its progression. No less so, the conventions for
language-use, the criteria and grammatical schematism of concepts for the community at
large, evolve through the totality of a society’s linguistic-engagements. They thus seem
inaccessible to us because we are not capable of simultaneously interacting with everyone
all-the-time, the grammatical schematism of our personal idiolects results from our
engagement with only a relatively tiny portion of that totality. However, while the entire
community is evolving so too are we. By being engaged members of a dynamic
language-using community we receive constant feedback (we are understood and
misunderstood, our language-use is validated and invalidated) that drives us toward
attunement. Thus, over time, the schematism of our language approaches approximate
correspondence to that of the community at large. This tendency founds the striking
success of language but the idiosyncrasies of language use and training will inevitably
become manifest as well:

And obviously sometimes you’re going to be wrong in your assertion of the concept, and moreover you
can never be sure you are not wrong. So say if you like that there are bases for applying concepts, and
call those bases criteria; just don’t think it follows that you might not have to w
ithhold
the concept
sometimes. And it might be wise to add, whenever you do assert it, a pinch of recognition (e.g.,
‘almost certain’) that you may have to take it back 24
Cavell, Stanley. 
The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy,68. New
York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.
24
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The dictionary as well as the surface grammar of the language serve to explicate
and solidify the otherwise nebulously evolving rules for language-use and hence we may
find a common backing to many of our words and ways of speaking, but to truly ‘know’ a
word it must be heard and used in such a variety of contexts so as to flesh out (for oneself)
its schematization in language. Each individual’s criteria are manifest in the way that they
speak (in asserting a concept you make public the satisfaction of your criteria for that
concept’s use) and hence our interpersonal relationships and interactions engender the
feeling of ‘near certainty’ in our language use but this leaves no room for skepticism about
the so-called “reality” of the situation.
The mastery of a language is publicly manifest, just as ‘whether someone knows
how to play soccer’ will ordinarily be accessible to us through our perception of their
soccer match (though it is likely we may not be able to make such judgments without
ourselves possessing some semblance of the relevant techniques). Our training with
language is seen and heard in our competent or incompetent application of concepts in
language-games. Not only is our intuition for language use continually evolving but also,
like the soccer player whose perception (understanding) of the game around him is
gradually changed, the very way in which we perceive the world around us is altered
through language: Try to see not words in this sentence but rather squiggles of ink on the
page; try, in conversation, to hear not the words being said but the raw auditory sounds.
As we navigate the world around us we see that world 
as 
ourselves; having internalized
such sociocultural sign systems as language and mathematics our perception is forever
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altered.

7 Perception in the Light of Language
Experience, whether in the form of language or soccer, astronomy or mathematics,
trains us to understand, to 
perceive
and to navigate the world around us in light of that
training. We are not receptacles of raw sensory information which we then interpret. The
astronomer, viewing the topological aberrations on the surface of the moon, does not
encounter a kind of ‘raw picture of the moon’ that is t
hen 
interpreted in light of his or her
professional training; rather the astronomer literally perceives the moon i
n the light of his
or her training
. We do not, Wittgenstein would argue, hear raw auditory input from a
speaker and then somehow inject meaning into it with mental reference to prior
experience; but rather, 
in hearing
, we understand — semantic content, “meaning,” is a
fact of our use of language as proficient speakers. Just as you are not confronted with
scribbles on a page but words, you do not perceive 
and then
understand but, 
in perceiving,
understand. You perceive in light of your training with language. And so it is that the
world appears stratified for us — we are not presented with raw visual input but with
objects.
The notion, that we hear, see, speak, understand, perceive, 
in the light
of 

our
training with language (and our professional endeavors, our hobbies, &c.), compels us to
understand that our language use and our knowledge of and claims about our perceptions
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of this profoundly affected world,25 are not somehow justified by correspondence to the
so-called ‘nature of reality,’26 but rather are substantive by virtue of their place within the
rich environmental, personal, and cultural history that contextualizes them. For a
non-native speaker to be wrong in saying “this is a piece of painter” is for him to be in
disharmony with the community at large, he is wrong not because 
actually27 
it is ‘paper’
but because, conventionally, it is “paper,” because 
usually 
we call this “paper.”
Our accumulated experience, our history, shapes how we perceive the world, it
provides us with a lens through which objects take form, acquire identity, are
individuated. A tremendous portion of our history in the world is also our training with
language — every act of language we have ever encountered or performed, written or
read, seen or heard, whether in the confines of our own heads or in outward verbal
expression, together constitutes our training with language — and as such, language can
be said to lend significant weight to the lens of experience. The objects of our perception
and our abstraction are the fruit of human consciousness and not a glimpse into the
stratified contents of an objective reality. As such, the 
rightness and wrongness of our

claims, our capacities and justifications for belief and knowledge, all exist within those
same confines. For someone to be right or wrong, for a statement to be true, an individual
to be honest, an accusation to be justified; these questions are answered with no appeal to

25

The “affected world” here being the world inflected by our training with and use of language, the
world as it is engendered by the culture, community, history, and physiology nothing less than full-blooded
human beings; the world as 
we see it.
26
The idea that our claims about our perceptions of the world are justified by their correspondence to
the state of the real, is one of the foundational ideas in a representational theory of meaning and is a tacit
assumption of the skeptical problem of knowledge about other minds.
27
“Actually” insofar as the word is used in philosophical contexts to indicate a correspondence to
objective reality, e.g. “‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is 
actually w
hite”
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a transcendent state of affairs for they are games, they are activities and parts of
activities, they are contextualized physically, personally, culturally, and historically and it
would be nothing less than a distortion, a reduction, to seek more general answers to
them.
If a soccer player were to pass midfield while in possession of the ball, grow
nearer to the opposing goal but with the goalie facing her, while two opponents quickly
close in from behind, and only one teammate parallel to her on the opposite side of the
goal, the player then trying to curve the ball such that it might circumvent the goalie and
score, only to miss — would it make sense for us to question whether this was objectively
the right decision or the objectively wrong decision? Would it be sensible, if asked
whether this was the right call, to appeal to an objective state of affairs? Or should we say
that “the player was under a lot of pressure from midfield and only had a moment, she
could have passed to her teammate for a better angle on the goal but that would likely
have given the two opposing defenders the time needed to close the distance” — and this
too would probably be a highly reductive analysis. I return to the example of soccer to
illustrate the unrelenting complexity of actual human activity and accordingly, that the
question of rightness and wrongness here, in 
this
context, is answered through the
resources of the game alone and thus necessitates the mastery of the technique. The
context of the soccer player is no more or less intricate than that of the language speaker.

8 Finding Truth
To master a language, then, is not to master objective reality (it is not to have
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somehow gained insight into how the world ‘really’ is) but to acquire a lens through which
that world may be carved up. Through this predominantly shared lens we gain the
capacity to communicate our experience, for, in carving up the world, we gain the facility
to draw out and speak of its pieces. Our training with language, understanding the
grammatical schematism of its concepts, constitutes that lens and that capacity. Thus, in
claiming “there is a cup in front of me” we ought not ask whether ‘in actuality’ there is a
cup for perhaps it is a tube (mug, hat, &c.), for this is neither the function nor privilege of
language, rather we must ask if what we are seeing is conventionally (usually, ordinarily,
&c.) a “cup,” or, if ‘wrong,’ perhaps it is (what the community would call) a “tube”,
“mug”, &c. The normativity of our perceptions, the very fact that we can intelligibly
question the veridicality of what we perceive, creates the false intuition that our
perceptions and claims are ‘true’ or ‘false’ based on some notion of what is ‘objectively the
case’ but there are no things, no individual entities, ‘objectively,’ for a claim to be held up
against. If I am wrong in my claim that “there is a cup in front of me” it is not because
‘objectively’ it is a tube, but because it is 
conventionally 
(typically, generally, &c.)
a tube,

it is usually called “a tube.” And so, had my training with language (specifically with
‘cups’ and ‘tubes’) been more comprehensive
I would have seen a tube 
and thus said “there
is a tube in front of me.” We must not be tricked into asking “is this actually anger” out of
a misbegotten intuition that the behavior, the criteria, merely indicate — though, of
course, the further peculiarities of emotion and how we talk about it warrant additional
analysis.
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To understand what an apple is; what we call an apple; the ‘meaning’ of ‘apple,’ is
to have the “ability to use the concept in conjunction with other concepts,” to have
“knowledge of which concepts are relevant to the one in question and which are not;” and
to know “how various relevant concepts, used in conjunction with the concepts of different
kinds of objects, require different kinds of contexts for their competent employment.”28 To
lack all of this, to lack the language training and hence the grammatical schematism for a
concept, is to lack “not only a piece of information or knowledge, but the possibility of
acquiring any information about such objects 
uberhaupt;
you cannot be told the name of
that object, because there is as yet no 
object.
”29 To see emotion, to see joy, despondence,
ire, and so on, in the world around us is to have mastered a language, to possess its vast
repertoire of concepts and their grammatical schematism, to possess their criteria and to
hence perceive the world in light of them, to perceive the world 
constituted
by them. Once
this is the case, “Consciousness is as clear in his face and behavior, as in myself.”30
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III.

Emotion

1 Introduction
In his 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology31
, Wittgenstein sets out to
undermine and problematize much of the philosophical canon regarding the mind and how
we talk about it. J.L. Austin’s landmark essay 
Other Minds32
accomplishes many of the
same goals and, though they set about their work in characteristically different ways,
Austin and Wittgenstein ultimately arrive in similar territory. In exploring each of their
perspectives we will come to see that the way that we talk about the phenomenality — the
quality or ‘feel’ — of our experience is deeply misbegotten; whether those locutions take
form in the description of someone else’s mental state or in an account of our own
experience, there are profoundly misleading assumptions manifest in the ways that we
talk about feeling and emotion. The fallible characterization of phenomenology (the
misleading depiction of conscious, quality-laden experience) evident in the way we speak
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of/describe emotions is symptomatic of a misunderstanding of how the verb ‘to know’
works — how and when we ‘know,’ what it is ‘to know.’
The epistemological issues that seem to arise with the notion of private experience,
and specifically those that arise in the context of the Cartesian mind33, are the result of the
assumption that when we speak of the mind, whether ours or another’s, we are reporting
on a kind of essentially private, interior life — that, to speak of or speculate about feelings
and emotions is to try to g
et at 
something fundamentally disconnected from the exterior,
physical world. Stanley Cavell’s 
The Claim of Reason34
advocates the Wittgensteinian
position that, often, the outward behavior of a person quite simply 
is
the criteria for the
emotion, for ‘calling out’ their anger, for ‘knowing’ the man is expecting someone. In
exploring the interwoven arguments of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell I hope to
ultimately show that, given the intersecting points of these authors, not only is the
locution “I am expecting a friend” an 
expression 
of expectation but that behavior itself can
be seen as an expression of phenomenality; or, rather, that one’s particular behavior
(including the use of language) in a particular context, is manifest from, necessitated by,
and an expression of their experiential state.
There is a further issue that I believe is worth bringing notice to now and as it is
one that will recur throughout the writing to come: Language, being inescapably the
medium through which I here will be formulating an argument, poses constraints on my
writing that are of the very type I wish to highlight and renounce. For example, when I
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speak of an individual’s experiential “state” I am being unintentionally misleading. One of
the fundamental, seemingly omnipresent assumptions exemplified in (or, at the very least,
reinforced by) our language use that has also toxically extended into philosophical
discourse, is the objective existence of, singular entities — the existence, that is, of
objectively singular
objects — which, in totality, constitute an objective reality. While this
notion is complicated to articulate, it is actually a rather simple idea that happens to be
constrained by the opaque language used to describe it. Do not mistake me for saying that
‘states,’ ‘cups,’ emotions,’ &c. do not exist for surely we are not wrong to speak of them,
rather the point is that the constant linguistic realization of such concepts consolidates an
intuition that, objectively, outside of human experience, there exist individuated ‘things’
that our words refer to — that though the name ‘cup’ is simply a tag we have created,
underneath the word is some actual, existent object. Later in this paper I will be exploring
in far greater detail what this assumption means for philosophy and why, despite how
tremendously intuitive it is, we ought not subscribe to it. For now though, be aware that
the constraints posed by language resolve me to speak of mental “states,” of “atoms,” of
distinct “criteria,” and so forth but this is not to say that such ‘things’ exist as individual
entities objectively — the importance of this point will become far clearer as the paper
progresses.
The notion that my behavior, both internal and external, verbal and nonverbal, to
be an expression/manifestation of my experience carries the invaluable implication that
emotion (the quality of conscious experience) is, so to speak, worn on our sleeves. To some
this may seem obvious or intuitive but it carries with it far-reaching epistemological and
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ontological implications that I will here attempt to explicate. However, it is first important
to note that this claim is neither saying that all emotion can be reduced to behavior, nor
that we ought not concern ourselves with one’s inner, conscious life in making a judgment.
The argument I will be presenting in retaliation against the skeptical tradition is fully
distinct from behaviorism and conventionalism. Rather, in this paper I will attempt to
show that behavior is one illuminating facet in a larger totality that, in many
circumstances, can facilitate the ready and accurate assessment of emotion — in ordinary
light and familiar circumstances we readily perceive the consciousness of others, we s
ee
their happiness, anger, &c. This is by no means to be taken as the claim that one can
introspect
another individual’s experience (that one can feel what someone else is feeling),
but merely that, in the same way that we presently see this paper before us, we can and
often do see (recognize) emotion.

2 Wittgenstein on Ascriptions of Mental States
Toward the end of his 
Philosophical Investigations35
Wittgenstein fervently denies
that first-person ascriptions of mental states such as “I’m expecting him to arrive in five
minutes” or “I wish it would stop raining” are reports or descriptions of some necessarily
interior (and hence private) mental state. Rather these statements, in Wittgenstein’s eyes,
are actually manifestations of the mental states, or e
xpressions
of them. When I am
expecting a friend to arrive, when I am experiencing the state of ‘expectation,’ that state
may be expressed in my saying ‘I’m expecting her to arrive soon’ or ‘where is she?’ Just
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as I might rub my temples when having a particularly troubling headache, I also might
say ‘I’m in pain’ and the locution is no less an expression of my psychological state than
my rubbing my temples. As Wittgenstein explains, “By nature and particular training…
we are disposed to give spontaneous expression to wishes in certain circumstances.”36
The boy who, after being stung by a bee, says ‘that hurts!’ is expressing his pain as
much as he is by shaking the arm that got stung by the bee, “The statement ‘I am
expecting a band at any moment’ is an expression of expectation” (Wittgenstein, P.253)37
— Wittgenstein is making the point that such ascriptions are not to be seen as the
external signs of some internal phenomenon but rather should be viewed as themselves a
part of the experienced state, a part of ‘being in pain.’ In some cases, part of what it is to
be in pain is to say “Ouch that hurts!” Just as in some cases part of what it means to wish
for something is to say ‘I wish...’
Wittgenstein goes on to explain that in the case of third-person ascriptions, like
‘she’s bored’ or ‘he might be in pain,’ we are, much like in the case of first-person
ascriptions, merely expressing our behavior towards others. That is, in many
circumstances, part of what it means for me to believe someone is bored is to say “she’s
bored.” Similarly, we can imagine a circumstance where someone is being punished and I,
being an onlooker, am concerned for their well being; in this circumstance my saying
“Sarah, he’s in pain!” is an expression of my belief that Sarah’s victim is in pain and, too,
that I am concerned and want her to stop hurting him. Wittgenstein writes that “being
sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural
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instinctive kinds of behavior towards other human beings, and our language is merely an
auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is an extension of
the primitive behavior.”38 In this passage, the “primitive behavior” to which Wittgenstein
refers can be understood as the more reflexive or basic behavior that often accompanies a
feeling or emotion; thus wincing or grimacing when in pain or pacing anxiously when
anticipating something constitute kinds of primitive behavior. So, when Wittgenstein
notes that our language is “merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of” our
instinctive behaviors towards other people we can see the implication that Wittgenstein,
like Austin, recognizes that the states deemed essentially ‘inner’ and ‘private’ in the
traditional formulation of the ‘problem of other minds’ are in fact tied up, in most ordinary
contexts, with an entire array of manifestly public behaviors; and, though those behaviors
(both primitive and linguistic) in some cases necessitate a level of language proficiency to
be understood — to be 
seen 
— the way we behave and talk is deeply intertwined with the
quality and emotion of our experience. The way we behave is manifest from and an
expression of the phenomenality of our experience. As such, in the right context (in broad
daylight, viewed by someone who knows you well, for example), it should be plainly
evident how you are feeling; whether you are angry or sad, content or restless. We need
not ambiguate the situation of someone commenting on, for example, an angry person by
asking “But is she really angry, or are these just symptoms of anger?” For, in ordinary
circumstances, that should be clear as day and, if it is not, that is not because their
outward behavior is a mere an indication of a fundamentally inaccessible interior but
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because perhaps in the present context the criteria do not plainly show anger, perhaps
they show something more complex — a shade of anger, a combination of rage and
self-pity, &c.

3 Austin on Signs and Symptoms
As Austin writes in his 
Philosophical Papers,
we may talk of signs of a storm that
has or will occur but not of one that is presently occurring. The air might be thick and so
‘smell like a storm is coming’, or the morning after one there might be a lightning strike in
a tree, and all of these things might be considered signs of a storm, but we ought not talk
about the literal presence of a storm, of black clouds and pouring rain and thunder, as
‘signs of a storm,’ they simply 
are 
the storm. Analogously, it is possible that one might
enter a house and find it in disarray (papers everywhere, a broken chair, &c.) and rightly
say that these things are signs of anger, of someone who was angry. But in the presence
of anger we ought never talk of its many manifestations and characteristics as signs or
symptoms of anger for they quite simply 
are
the anger, are part of the anger, are
expressions 
of anger. “What is important,” Austin writes, “is that we never talk of
‘symptoms’ or ‘signs’ except 
by way of implied contrast with inspection of the item itself.”
39

Both Austin and Wittgenstein thus retaliate against the traditional skepticism

regarding other minds, the seemingly intuitive language we use in talking about emotion
deludes us into seeing our words as indicating mental states instead of describing them,
being a part of them.
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4 Cavell on Criteria and Deep Grammar
The notion of criteria here plays a very important role for they justify us in
our claims about emotion and, more particularly, can be seen as the cause or stimulus for
those claims. To have the criteria for a concept is to ‘understand’ it, to see and know it in
the world, to be capable of seeing and knowing it. For Cavell, criteria justify the observer
in the knowledge claim (in saying) “that is X.” And what could ‘knowing’ be, besides
being justified in claiming to know? In seeing that criteria justify the knowledge claim we
must also see that this (having the criteria) 
is
what it is ‘to know X’. And, as such, to
have the criteria for a concept (for that concept to be grammatically schematized in one’s
personal lexicon) is to understand it — to, literally, see, identify, and 
know i
t in the world
around us. In possessing the criteria for the concept of ‘expecting a friend’ one can
recognize, literally, 
see
the man (pacing anxiously, checking his diary, looking out the
window, and setting out tea) 
as ‘a man expecting a friend’.

The criteria do not relate a name to an object, but, we might say, various concepts to the concept of
that object. Here the test of your possession of a concept (of the meaning of a word; of what it is to
know something) would be your ability to use the concept in conjunction with other concepts, your
knowledge of which concepts are relevant to the one in question and which are not; your knowledge of
how various relevant concepts, used in conjunction with the concepts of different kinds of objects,
require different kinds of contexts for their competent employment40
Cavell, Stanley. 
The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy,73. New
York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.
40
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In possessing the grammatical schematism, explained above, for ‘cup’ (in knowing
what a cup is), I do not see the white, round shape in front of me that is filled with clear
liquid and then through some ambiguous mental gymnastics arrive at the conclusion that
there is a cup in front of me, 
I simply see the cup
, I ‘know’ there is a ‘cup’ in front of me.
In fact, when looked at more closely, we can see that the notion (of perceiving the
characteristics of the cup and only then deducing that it is indeed a cup) is poorly
disguised nonsense. If, in ordinary circumstances, I did actually perceive the
characteristics of the cup in order to conclude its being a ‘cup’, then how did I ascertain
the precise identity of those informing characteristics? How did I know it was ‘white’ and
‘round’? By observing the underlying characteristics of whiteness and roundness and
hence deducing that it was white and round? Then what of those characteristics? The
regression here outlines the fallibility of the inciting idea. We do not, in clear light and
ordinary circumstance, privately ascertain the identity of our perceptions, rather, we
simply see the cup as a cup. Having been trained into proficiency in a language we have
acquired a vast and intricate web of concepts and an intuition, a mastered technique, for
their profoundly nuanced and varied contextual employment.
In learning a language we learn a way of seeing the world, we learn to see 
our
world
.
When I see the boy in class with eyes drifting around the room, with his head
perched carelessly on his hands, having no overt reaction to the professor’s lecture, I
simply see that he is bored, I possess the concept of boredom and recognize its criteria
here and can hence quite simply tell that he is bored. As Wittgenstein writes, “Look into

Segal
67

someone else's face, and see the consciousness in it, and a particular shade of
consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor, and so
on… Do you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his face? It is there as
clearly as in your own breast.”41

5 Reconciling Language and Emotion
Having established the idea that language provides (a portion of) the lens through
which we view the world, that as proficient language users we literally perceive the ‘cup,’
the ‘storm,’ the man’s ‘anger,’ and that our perception of these things need not be tethered
to some notion of objectivity but rather can be understood as a testament to our active,
ongoing engagement in the language-speaking community. While there are cases of
ambiguity, in ordinary circumstances the storm does not come to us piecemeal: high
winds, heavy rain, thunder in the distance, and (wait for it) lightning! are not consolidated
in some kind of conceptual, cognitive-arithmetic that outputs ‘storm.’ No less,
Wittgenstein’s man pacing back and forth, looking out the window, checking his datebook,
&c. can simply be seen as ‘a man expecting a friend.’ There will always be cases of
exception, cases where we are reticent, where our judgment is held back, but these are not
indicative of some general principle that states we, in all cases, 
can not
see his anger,
expectation, boredom, and so on. Rather our participation in the meaning-making practice
of language engenders a rich and colorful lens through which we 
do
see the storm, the
‘anger,’ the ‘man expecting a friend.’ But we must be careful here for we are in danger of
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making the same mistake that the skeptic makes: In precisely the same way that we ought
not extricate a general principle of The Unknowability of Emotion, so too we must
restrain ourselves from taking the ordinary visibility of emotion to entail the Necessarily
Ever-Present Visibility of Emotion. There are a great many cases where, in fact, we
simply do not know an individual’s precise emotional state and, further, there are cases
where we even may never know!
Toward the end of Austin’s essay 
Other Minds
he speculates that Mr. Wisdom
(advocating skepticism of other minds) is “justified” in feeling that “there is a further and
quite 
special
difficulty”42 in the case of knowledge about mental states and clarifies this
saying “Might the man not exhibit all the symptoms (and display and everything else) of
anger, even ad infinitum, and yet still 
not 
(really) 
be a
ngry?”43 On the surface this
question seems intuitive, surely we often exhibit the behavior of one thing while feeling
another altogether, surely we can 
act
. Let us consider that perhaps the issue is not so
much 
is she sad and only pretending to be happy?
but instead
isn’t my thought “

is she sad
and only pretending to be happy?
” itself a complicated and expression of my perception of
her emotional state. First let us turn to Wittgenstein when he writes that we see not just
emotion in the face of another but a “particular shade” of emotion. Here he highlights an
important reality: Emotion is no simple, easily reducible thing; there is a color, shade,
nuance, and subtlety to our conscious experience. It is a rare thing for someone to
conform, without remainder or reduction, to our articulations of emotional states. The
lack of tone and nuance at play in such scenarios as being described as ‘happy,’ ‘sad,’
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‘angry’ or otherwise fails profoundly to encapsulate the depth and context of our feelings-Even our more subtle, particularized adjectives (quizzical, disgruntled, serene) rarely do
justice to the totality and specificity of the experienced emotion. Truly we do have a
powerful intuition that we can be something and yet behave as something else but I take
this delusion to arise from a too casually simplified construal of what it is to 
‘be something
’
at all.
If I am angry and angry is all I am (assuming we can even sensibly talk of such a
thing) then I would necessarily behave angrily, my behavior would express my anger and
be a part of it, of being angry. But surely, Austin posits, could you not possess that precise
feeling and yet, for whatever reason, behave differently? Well, if I were upset, and for
whatever reason wanted to express myself differently -- for example because I don’t want
my friends to worry -- then I am not simply upset. Rather, I am upset and also nervous or
ashamed or concerned &c. at the prospect of my friends worrying and, as such, my
behavior is a precisely suited expression of that state. Sometimes a part of being angry
and ashamed is trying to behave in such a way as to disguise that anger. Perhaps I can
successfully mislead my friends into seeing me as not upset but that is not because my
outward state differs in kind from my inward one, rather it is precisely because of the way
that I feel, in totality, that my behavior takes that form.
My behavior (attempting to act calm and unphased) is an expression of my mental
state (angry and ashamed) but only those possessing the relevant contextual details,
familiarity with my idiosyncrasies, knowledge of my natural history, would be able to see
it as such. The recognition of the criteria here for my mental state depends on not just the
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possession of the grammatical schematism for the relevant general concepts but also on
the possession of an intimate personal, contextual knowledge which furnishes those
concepts with meaning and specificity in this particular context, in this particular
interaction with this particular person. thus, while it might mislead my acquaintances,
upon returning home to my spouse and exhibiting the same behavior, she, given her more
intimate knowledge of my idiosyncrasies, history, and recent context, might very well see
me as ‘upset, ashamed, and doing my utmost to hide it.’ Thus in the specific context of my
standing front of someone who possesses the relevant knowledge, my behavior 
is
the
criteria for my mental state, for seeing me as ‘upset and ashamed.’ Whereas, in the case of
a stranger, I am seen as perfectly alright but not because, as the skeptic advocates, my
external being is a fallible symptom of my internal being; rather it is because my ongoing
behavior is part of a larger totality of which the stranger, unlike the confidant, is not
aware. To speak of ‘being angry’ and o
nly
‘angry’ may very well be nonsense as the
quality of our experience does not fall neatly into categories that can classify our present
states without ambiguity or blindness to some facet of our present experience. If we could
simply be angry then it would manifest truly. Still this is counter-intuitive, we protest
‘Well I really am happy right now and yet can wear a guise of apathy or sadness, you
would never know!’ And indeed it is the case that 
Im
ay ‘never know,’ but the crux of the
matter is not so much whether a false-portrayal of your present state is successful or
unsuccessful but that in fact there is no such thing as a false-portrayal at all, just a bad
judgment on my part or on over-simplification on theirs.
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Take, for example, Elizabeth. Each day when I arrive home from work I chat with
my housemate Elizabeth, who is at school during the day. On one particular afternoon I
arrive home expecting to find her upset, because earlier that day a mutual friend
mentioned that every single student in one of Elizabeth’s classes had failed their midterm
exam. I expected Elizabeth to be upset because I know that she, like myself, takes her
academic work very seriously. Strangely though, when I walked into our kitchen and said
hello she did not seem upset at all. Rather, she appeared to be contentedly cooking,
seemingly unperturbed by the day’s events. I wondered to myself, i
s she really happy or
just pretending to be happy? 
Here we have a case in which, surely, I do not know how she
feels. What does this tell us about our ascriptions of mental states? Well, when viewing
this situation as a lack of judgment, a kind of back-and-forth between two emotions
(happy and upset), it does indeed seem that I am simply at a loss. However, if we take a
step back from the utterance and, instead of viewing it as my inability to reach a judgment
about her emotional state, see the entire expression — “is she really happy, or just
pretending to be happy?” — taken in totality, as a judgment, as an ascription of a mental
state, then our view would be cleared.
Let us imagine that, as it turns out, there has always been an unspoken
competitiveness to my relationship with Elizabeth who, as such, was embarrassed about
her failing mark and withheld any explicit show of her own irritation so that I would not
think less of her. The problem here is that we are very attached to our emotional 
labels
—
the fact that we cannot easily apply ‘happy’ or ‘sad’ makes us uneasy, as though my
oscillating between the two were as unsubstantive as my not making any judgment at all.
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But 
this
is the point! My entire expression, the very fact that I was indeed experiencing
such an internal dialogue about whether it could be this or that, was itself an honest
expression of my understanding of her emotional state. It is as though, to place us in
familiar ground, we could have a third emotion word ‘
really-happy-or-just-pretending’
that I can see her as, just as I can see the ‘angry’ man or the expectant one, and so on.
The perception of emotion is a complicated dialogue between the observer and the
observed. The relevant contextual details (the failed test), my historical or personal
knowledge of the individual (the unspoken competition, academic seriousness, &c.), as
well as the current context (Elizabeth’s calm demeanor while cooking) all culminate in my
perception of Elizabeth in this situation — it is the full-blooded complexity of human life,
of felt experience 
and nothing less
that engenders such rich and densely populated visions
as our own.

Your present feelings, your beliefs, expectations, desires and goals, are all
exemplified simultaneously, occurently, in 
how you
are right now

, and ‘what you are
doing’ is as much a part of how you are as ‘what you are feeling’. If I feel happy and
pretend to be sad then I have my reasons for doing so--the reality is not that there is a
dichotomy of ‘
really
’ being happy that runs parallel to ‘coming off’ as sad, but instead that
what I ‘really’ am is not reducible to a single emotion, like ‘happy’, but rather is a vastly
intricate network of feelings, beliefs, ambitions, intentions, motivations, past experiences
&c. So it is that when I pretend to be sad I am not so much ‘actually happy’ as I am
‘actually happy and somehow motivated to appear sad,’ and hence the behavior that is
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being called pretending is in fact a necessarily appropriate manifestation of how I truly
am. We misleadingly label it ‘pretending’ simply because we often lack the relevant
information or context to label it what it actually is.
Indeed, we have all experienced being angry and yet simultaneously reluctant for
whatever reason (insecurity, shame, fear) to admit or expose that anger; thus our external
manifestation may be delusive (someone could easily misinterpret your 
seeming 
lack of
anger as an 
actual 
lack of anger) but really it is perfectly suitable. To 
be
angry-and-hesitant-to-admit-that-anger is to 
behave a
ngry-and-hesitant-toadmit-that-anger. In a case like this where one’s emotional state is complex the observer
may very well be too unfamiliar with your behavior or the wider context of your history
and as a result misinfer what your behavior 
is,
but the relevance of how well you judge
harkens back to Austin’s qualification of knowledge. It should not be surprising, really it
should be obvious, that our judgments about someone’s behavior are often wrong, just as
our judgments about the world and everything else often are. While this difficulty is
frustrating it is not so insurmountable that we can take refuge in the notion that, even in
theory, we 
could not
know

, as if due to some enigmatic cloaking mechanism. Rather than
plead impossibility we should consider that, in situations where we fail to accurately
assess behavior, it is not the privy access to the person’s phenomenal state that is our
undoing but instead our lack of information, familiarity, intimacy, historical knowledge
&c. with the person that disallows us from recognizing the criteria being presented to us .
The fact that we do not necessarily have an accurate understanding of the behavior
we seek to understand should 
not
lead to a bifurcation of mind from body but rather to a
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careful consideration of the wider context. All apparent aberrations of behavior stem from
a lack of necessary or relevant information. In knowing someone intimately for many
years, in sharing experience and life with them, the behavior, which to someone less
educated in their particular manner of being would seem ‘sad,’ would to you be aptly
recognized as ‘happy-but-trying-to-appear-sad’ for reasons x, y, z. Surely I am not alone
in having been upset while trying to maintain a ‘happy-face’ when low-and-behold
someone very close to me asked what was wrong, where no one else possessed the
relevant context and familiarity that would have allowed them to recognize that there was
something wrong at all. Like language, behavior is nuanced and entrenched in context, to
assume that an action can be isolated from its situation and still evaluated as though it
corresponds so simply to a single thing is to dramatically oversimplify the fact that
everything we do is a part of everything we are. Recognizing the fallibility of judgment
must not lead to the conclusion that what we see overtly is a potentially delusive version
of what we are under the surface; instead we should endorse the idea that the fallibility of
our judgments arises out of our lack of relevant knowledge and our blindness to greater
context. The more you know the more accurately you can see someone’s actions for what
they are.
In the end then, the ‘something special’ in the case of recognizing another’s feelings
that Austin hints at toward the end of 
Other Minds
mustn't be referring to a mysterious
dualism of mind and body but rather to the less mysterious, and far less troubling,
understanding that you simply can’t know everything and so at best all judgments are
approximate. To those who have all of the relevant knowledge (though few they will

Segal
75

likely be) it will be necessarily evident what the manifest behavior really is because that
behavior is an infinitely nuanced exemplification of how you really are. A final
clarification: To behave a facsimile of usual-anger does not mean that you are actually, or
even nearly angry but that the act of, and motives for, attempting to give a false
impression of yourself would have some external criteria and so (given proper contextual
knowledge) could be reasonably distinguished from actual anger. To actually behave
happy is to be actually happy.

6 Idiosyncrasy and Commonality
And, though our outward behavior in all of its massive nuance and complexity is
manifest from and an expression of the equally subtle and intricate phenomenology behind
it, there is another important facet of Austin’s question we must elucidate such that we
might further understand the confusion surrounding other minds. Due to the inherent
contrast in the way each of us experience the world, as unique human beings possessed of
unique neurophysiological capacities, idiosyncratic histories and so on, we thus express
ourselves, our psychological states, in unique and varied ways. The contrast in the
experience of one human to another, biological and historical, is manifest in the contrast in
their behavior. The teenager whose therapist has indicated a ‘problem with anger’ and
provided coping strategies for it naturally expresses her anger in a unique way, in a way
inflected by her experience with her therapist and, generally, in a way inflected by her
entire natural history. This, the disparity in our modes of experience and means of
expression, is vitally important to understanding why Austin’s question is misleading.
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When Austin describes the man as exhibiting “all the symptoms (and display and
everything else) of anger” we must understand Austin to be generalizing; that is, the man
exhibits all of the conventional, ordinary, usual, standard &c. behavior of anger and yet
‘really’ feels something besides anger. The variety of manifestations that our phenomenal
states may take is in a sense equilibrated here such that, going about the world, one can
assess the ‘typical’ behavior of the ‘typical’ person, but this leveling off, this abstraction
from the particular is deeply misleading as it allows us to seemingly sensibly pose Austin’s
question. When we instead zoom in and examine a particular case of an actual person’s
behavior we can see that, though their behavior might not be the conventional/usual
manifestation of whatever emotion, it 
is their
expression of that emotion.

7 Inferential Distance or Ordinary Ambiguity?
The seeming inferential distance in our judgments of other minds, or, rather, in the
way we perceive emotion in the world around us, is far less mysterious than the
philosophical tradition has made it out to be. The same kind of misunderstanding that is
constantly at play in our lives as we interact with the world is what we too hastily deem a
mysterious inferential distance in how we see, and misunderstand, the emotions of others.
Take Jones, as he walks down the road at dusk he surveys the horizon and sees a person
standing, immobile in the lawn a block down. As Jones approaches the person he becomes
better illuminated, and can be seen more clearly, at this point Jones realizes that the
‘person’ he was seeing is actually an oddly shaped mailbox. The process of Jones
approaching the person, of Jones becoming suspicious of the figure’s extended stillness, of

Segal
77

the increasingly clear mailbox-esque shape of the person, all resulting in Jones’ ultimately
seeing that, no, it is a mailbox, is entirely analogous to the process of approaching a
person and seeing that they are happy, realizing gradually that their smile falters, hearing
about some unfortunate news regarding them, and ultimately seeing that, no, this person
is upset and trying to retain a ‘happy face.’

8 Conclusion
Behavior is honest. Our phenomenal experience is manifest, however subtly or
imperceptibly, in our behavior. We can misunderstand behavior, we do sometimes
misunderstand emotion. This is the result of the complexity of felt-experience and the
nuance and richness of relevant contextual, historical and personal information which we
may or may not be in possession of. To say that lacking these things and thus calling
someone angry when really they were “pretending to be irritated” is a result of the
fundamental inaccessibility of other minds is no more sensible than if I were to claim that
my having never played croquet and hence not being able to understand44 the state of the
game entails an unbreachable barrier between myself and croquet.
A final passage from Austin in answer to the residual dissatisfaction that such a
discussion is ultimately besides the point because, “The real crux of the matter remains

44

In the Wittgensteinian sense, understanding as “the mastery of a technique.”
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still that ‘I ought not to say that I know Tom is angry, because I don’t introspect his
feelings’”

1. Of course 
I
don’t 
introspect Tom’s feelings...
2. Of course 
I
do
sometimes know Tom is angry.
3. To suppose that the question ‘How do I know that Tom’s angry?’ is meant to mean ‘How do I
introspect Tom’s feelings?’, … is simply barking our way up the wrong gum tree 45

The Cartesian narrative of mind independent from a body, of inside and outside,
has long been damaging to both ordinary intuitions and philosophical discussions — our
behavior whether public (what others see of us) or private (one’s inner monologue) fully
exemplifies, 
is literally suited to, necessitated by, and an expression of
, the phenomenality
of our experience. And, though it is not unusual for an observer to lack some relevant
information or familiarity which would enable him to recognize the outward behavior, the
criteria, of the person being observed as the emotion that it is, there are indeed external
criteria that, given relevant historical and contextual knowledge as well as language
proficiency, enable the observer to recognize what they are feeling, to “see the
consciousness in [someone else’s face].”46 The idiosyncratic sensory modalities and
neurophysiological capacities each of us possess certainly engender challenging variety in
outward criteria and the inability of such simple, one-dimensional words for emotion
(‘happy,’ ‘sad,’ &c.) to encompass the complexity and nuance therein ultimately come
together to create this confusion and misunderstanding laden picture of emotion and how
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we talk about it; but nowhere in this idiosyncrasy riddled confusion is there space for the
notion that we misunderstand and mislabel emotion because it exists apart from its
outward symptoms. We must not look at the dark clouds and lightning and say “look,
signs of a storm.
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